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I. I n t r o d u c t io n

The Great Depression prompted the modem era of broad, intensive federal regulation
of corporate capital raising. The crown jewel and major innovation of this regulatory
regime was mandatory disclosure—the requirement that issuers of securities disclose
specific information to the public, both upon issuance and on an ongoing basis post
issuance. This disclosure requirement was intended to empower investors to make their
own decisions, by ensuring that the public received a baseline of relevant (and uniformly
presented) information from issuing companies.1 U.S. corporate financing has been
profoundly shaped by this regulatory design ever since.
Of course, mandatory disclosure is not costless. The direct transaction costs to issuers,
their underwriters, and the government are substantial, to say nothing of the indirect costs.2
Given the stakes involved, the obvious and crucial question is whether mandatory
disclosure actually works. Does it even achieve the goals ascribed to it, and if so, do these
benefits outweigh the associated costs? After more than eight decades of federal securities
regulation, the answers to these questions remain surprisingly elusive. It turns out that
testing the securities laws’ effectiveness is extraordinarily difficult, and the limited
evidence obtained to date is decidedly mixed.
This Article asserts that we may finally gain some purchase on this question—if only
we look in the right place. Whether implicitly or explicitly, discussions of the merits of
securities regulation deal almost exclusively with equity instruments, particularly common
stock, rather than with debt. The privileging of equity over debt is ubiquitous in the
literature.3 Yet the corporate debt markets swamp the equity markets in size.4 Ignoring the
debt markets when assessing the securities laws is a surprising omission that this Article
seeks to remedy.
Indeed, recent sweeping changes in the debt markets have created near-perfect
conditions for testing mandatory disclosure’s effectiveness. Long viewed as contrasting

1. Mandatory disclosure thus stands in stark contrast to government agencies’ substantive review of
investment opportunities, which until then had been the states’ predominant form of securities regulation. See
Frank FI. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection o f Investors, 70 V a . L. Rev .
669, 669-70 (1984) (contrasting the federal disclosure regime with the substantive regulation of investments).
2. See infra Part II.B (discussing the costs and benefits of mandatory disclosure).
3. In discussions of the securities laws, this predilection for equity over debt is explained by the fact that
equity securities are riskier overall, and retail direct investors still hold a meaningful share of the stock market.
See infra note 88 (dealing with the near-complete absence of direct retail investors from the corporate debt
markets).
4. In 2006 alone, the total amount of corporate debt issuances exceeded $1 trillion, compared to only $152
billion in equity issuances. Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, Markets: Transparency and the
Corporate Bond Market, 22 J. Econ. P ersp . 217,219 (2008).
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forms of debt, the markets for large corporate loans (referred to as syndicated loans) and
corporate bonds are rapidly converging into a single asset class .5 Yet bonds are treated as
securities under the federal securities laws, while loans are not. The existence of two
functionally equivalent markets, one regulated and the other unregulated, amounts to a
natural experiment testing the federal securities laws’ effects on the largest source of
corporate financing, the corporate debt markets. Though the convergence is as yet
incomplete, it is enough to make the longstanding regulatory distinction between the two
untenable under existing doctrine.
That bonds and loans are now virtually interchangeable is nothing short of remarkable.
In the canons of corporate finance, the two instruments have historically been at opposite
ends of the debt spectrum .6 Corporate bonds were typically understood as long-term,
passive investments in blue-chip corporations. Bank loans, on the other hand, were short
term extensions of credit most suited to small, opaque companies requiring intensive
monitoring by the creditor. Bonds were thus appropriate for dispersed, unsophisticated
retail investors, and were highly liquid instruments (that is, readily tradable). By contrast,
loans were funded nearly exclusively by banks, which specialized in credit analysis, had
the ability and incentives to monitor their borrowers closely, and were themselves tightly
regulated entities. Because of the steep information costs associated with these loans, they
were typically held to maturity by the bank that funded them, and thus plainly illiquid.
These fundamental differences between bonds and loans in the nature and type of their
creditors, their liquidity, and the information required by creditors justified the treatment
of bonds as securities and loans as non-securities.
Yet dramatic changes to the corporate loan market have converted it into something
closely akin to the bond market.7 Changes in both supply and demand have radically
altered the fundamental nature of corporate loans, transforming them into instruments that
can be traded by passive investors. Large corporate loans are no longer funded and held to
maturity by a single bank, but instead are syndicated to large groups of creditors and
subsequently traded to reach still other creditors. More surprising still, banks represent only
a small minority of such creditors. The outcome of this rapid and dramatic metamorphosis
of the loan market is a new capital market that is both deep and highly liquid. The
convergence of the bond and loan markets is particularly striking at the riskiest end of the
spectrum in each. High-yield (or “junk”) bonds and leveraged loans refer to the bonds and
syndicated loans, respectively, of companies with high ratios of debt to equity in their
capital structure. Leveraged loans and high-yield bonds currently feature strikingly similar
pricing, non-price terms, participants, and liquidity.
Unless and until the loan and bond markets become perfectly interchangeable (save
for their regulation), the conclusions drawn from this natural experiment will necessarily
be tentative. Yet, based solely on the convergence exhibited thus far, we may already derive
a crucial result: the very existence of a liquid corporate loan market suggests that the

5. See infra Part IV (discussing the convergence of loans and bonds).
6. See infra Part III (discussing the opposing paradigms of loans and bonds).
7. See infra Part IV (discussing the convergence of loans and bonds).
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securities laws8 are not doing the work for which they were intended. Consider the two
bedrock goals of mandatory disclosure under the federal securities laws: (1) protecting
unsophisticated investors,9 and (2) remedying the underproduction of material investment
information.10 The first goal is simply inapplicable in today’s debt markets, because both
the corporate loan and corporate bond markets are, for all intents and purposes, purely
institutional.11 Retail investors have always been absent from the corporate loan market,
and recently have all but disappeared from the corporate bond market.12 Concerns about
protecting individuals who cannot absorb losses are thus allayed in these markets.
The second goal requires some elaboration. The currently dominant theory supporting
mandatory disclosure holds that, left to their own devices, companies lack incentives to
provide investors with sufficient information, and investors lack incentives to pay for it,
due to now familiar free-riding and collective action problems. Armed with too little
reliable information, rational investors in an unregulated market will invest less than is
efficient—a bad outcome for both investors and issuers. Requiring issuers to disclose
material information to the public could thus increase the volume of investment in a market
to something closer to its optimal level. In this view, mandatory disclosure is not a burden
on investment (as issuers frequently lament), but rather a necessary condition to robust
investment.
Unfortunately, the convergence of the loan and bond markets to date strongly suggests
that this second aim of securities regulation is unrealized in the corporate debt markets:
mandatory disclosure cannot be a necessary condition to developing a deep and liquid
market, simply because the unregulated leveraged loan market, in which disclosure to

8. Throughout this Article, references to “securities regulation” or “securities laws” refer solely to the
mandatory disclosure rules imposed on securities’ issuers (including for these purposes anti fraud liability), rather
than to other areas o f securities regulation, i.e., the regulation offender offers, shareholder voting, broker-dealers,
and mutual funds, market transparency for trades, and, more recently, the regulation of corporate governance and
executive compensation under Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.
9. See H.R. R ep . N o . 73-1383, at 5 (1934) (“[I]t becomes a condition of the very stability o f . . . society
that its rules of law . . . protect [the] ordinary citizen’s dependent position.”); H.R. Rep . N o . 73-85, at 2 (1933)
(stating that “[t]he purpose of [the Securities Act of 1933] . . . is to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business.”); see generally JOEL SELIGMAN, The TRANSFORMATION OF W all Street : A
H istory of the Securities and Exchange C ommission and M odern C orporate Finance (3d ed. 2003)
(summarizing the views of proponents and legislators at the time the Securities Acts were enacted).
10. As a practical matter, the securities laws do not always result in issuers producing more, or mere
frequent, information. They often restrict, or at a minimum delay, the information flow from companies to the
market, most notably in the pre-IPO period. See, e.g., Nemit Shroff et al., Voluntary Disclosure and Information
Asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform, 51 J. ACCT. Res . 1299, 1299 (2013) (finding
that information released to the market actually increased following relaxation o f the SEC’s gun-jumping rules in
2005). Given that mandatory disclosure may in fact limit information flow to the market, critiques o f mandated
disclosure that rest on the problem of information overload to consumers might be misplaced. See, e.g., Omri
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure o f Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa . L. Rev . 647, 651 (2011)
(characterizing mandatory disclosure to consumers as being based on the false premise that “more information is
better than less’ ); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks o f the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 B aylor L. Re v . 139, 160-63 (2006) (describing how
securities regulation exacerbates information overload).
11. See infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the decrease in the proportion o f direct retail
investors).
12. Id.
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investors is limited, non-uniform, and purely voluntary, is now significantly larger than the
regulated high-yield bond market.13 Purely through private ordering, the loan market
appears to be providing sufficient information for investors to treat syndicated loans as they
do bonds—that is, as largely passive investments that do not require intensive monitoring
on their part. In summation, this implies that the securities laws are not achieving their
principal goal in the markets for corporate debt.
Admittedly, this sweeping conclusion is unlikely to be well received in a world still
scarred by the recent financial crisis. Yet, its normative implications are comparatively
mild. Despite the near equivalence of the two markets, issuers have not migrated wholesale
from the regulated high-yield bond market to the unregulated syndicated loan market; for
the time being, the two markets exist side-by-side. Thus, even if securities regulation is
unnecessary for robust investment in the corporate debt markets, it is also unlikely to truly
impede investment—the institutional structures to support mandated disclosure are already
in place, and investors such as mutual funds are still required to invest some portion of
their assets in registered securities. The securities laws applicable to corporate debt may
not be effective, yet nor do they appear terribly harmful. The latter point may explain why
the regulatory dichotomy between the corporate loan and bond markets persists to this day,
despite its now glaring lack of grounding: securities regulators may be tacitly (and
cynically) acknowledging that, whether they treat leveraged loans as securities or not, the
decision is unlikely to matter.
However, this Article’s skepticism about securities regulation in the debt markets
merits a word of caution. The fact that mandatory disclosure is proving superfluous in the
corporate debt markets certainly does not mean that the debt markets raise no regulatory
concerns. Debt-fueled investment bubbles are particularly worrisome: when the bubble
bursts and corporate credit suddenly dries up, as it did most dramatically during the Great
Depression and most recently from 2007-2009, the ripple effects are felt throughout the
economy, eventually harming “Main Street” workers and consumers. Far from advocating
a hands-off approach to the debt markets, this Article merely suggests that mandatory
disclosure is not (or is no longer) remedying the information failures for which it was
designed and has little or no bearing on regulators’ most pressing concern: systemic risk.14
In fact, while leveraged loan investors suffered steep losses in the recent financial crisis,
high-yield bond investors’ losses were steeper, in spite of the securities laws’ protections.15

13. In 2012, leveraged loan market issuances reached $664 billion, compared to $327 billion in high-yield
bond issuances. Ioana Barza, Press Release, 2012 U.S. High Yield Capital Markets Reach All-Time S991B
Record, Thomson Reuters LPC (Apr. 19, 2014, 8:50 PM), https://www.loanpricing.com/2013/01/2012-u-s-highyield-capital-markets-reach-all-time-991b-record/.
14. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 G eo . L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk as “the
risk that (i) an economic shock . . . triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of
markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the
cost of capital or decreases in its availability . . .”); see also Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson,
"Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo . L.J. 337, 337 (2013)
(recognizing “the public’s interest in a safe and stable financial system” as a key driver of securities regulation).
15. At the peak of U.S. corporate debt defaults in the fourth quarter of 2009, the leveraged loan default rate
reached approximately 12%, compared to approximately 16% in the high-yield bond market. Alicia Sansone et
al., Investing in Loans Through the Cycles, Loan Syndications & Trading A ss ’n , 4 (2013), available at
http ://www.lsta.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=l 6749.
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When the debt markets crash again—which they inevitably will—the presence or absence
of mandatory disclosure will not be the difference-maker.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys the largely inconclusive
empirical studies on the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure. Parts III through V offer a
different approach to assessing securities regulation in the debt markets. Specifically, Part
III describes the traditional opposing paradigms of corporate bonds and corporate loans
that long justified their status under the federal securities laws as securities and non
securities, respectively. Part IV identifies recent sweeping changes in the corporate loan
market that have caused it to converge rapidly with the bond market, putting tremendous
pressure on the two markets’ differing regulatory treatment. Part V first describes how this
convergence creates a natural experiment testing the effectiveness of the securities laws in
the debt markets. With both issuers and investors increasingly viewing these two liquid
markets—one regulated, the other not—as substitutes,16 the securities laws applicable to
corporate debt appear to be having little beneficial effect. Part V then concludes by
addressing policy implications.
II. M andatory D isclosure: W hat D o W e Know ?
A. Empirical Testing: Technical Concerns

Capital, like all good things in this world, is scarce. Firms compete with one another
for it, and convincing investors to part with their money for a time is no simple matter. A
firm’s value is not readily observable or verifiable by investors. Some level of corporate
disclosure is therefore necessary to entice wary investors and to achieve an efficient
allocation of capital among firms.17 This much is clear. Less clear is whether such
disclosure ought to be mandated, as it is currently for issuers of “securities” under federal
law, or purely voluntary.
Testing whether mandatory disclosure actually works has been a tantalizing
possibility since the halcyon days of U.S. securities regulation in the 1930s. Yet despite 80
years of broad, intensive securities regulation, we appear little closer to a conclusive,
empirically grounded result. It is safe to say that there is widespread agreement on two
seemingly conflicting points: (1) empirical testing of the securities laws is a worthy and, in
fact, crucial pursuit, and (2) such testing is plagued with conceptual and practical
difficulties that have rendered the results largely inconclusive. This section briefly reviews
the most salient empirical studies of mandatory disclosure and their critiques.18 Except

16. See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 4, at 230 (describing syndicated loans as “a substitute for
corporate bonds”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation o f the U.S. Financial Services Industry. 19752000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. III. L. R ev . 215, 379 (2002) (noting that
borrowers often view syndicated loans and bonds as substitutes); Yener Altunbas et al., Large Debt Financing:
Syndicated Loans Versus Corporate Bonds (European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 1028, 2009), available
at papers.ssm.com/sol 3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l 349667 (referring to the syndicated loan market as “the most
powerful substitute to the corporate bond markets” in the eurozone).
17. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital
Markets: A Review o f the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. A cer . & Econ . 405, 406 (2001).
18. See generally Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: A Review o f the Recent
Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & Eco n . 296 (2010) (reviewing in detail the empirical literature on mandatory disclosure).
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where noted, mandatory disclosure as used in this Article refers to required disclosures at
issuance of a security (such as the registration statement for an initial public offering),19
and the ongoing, periodic disclosure by large issuers (such as 8-K, 10-Q, and 10-K
filings),20 as well as to federal antifraud liability applied to issuers of securities and their
underwriters.21
In randomized drug trials—the gold standard for testing a treatment’s effectiveness—
the outcomes of the treatment group are compared to those of a control group, with patients
randomly assigned to one of the two groups. The desired outcome— improvement in the
patient’s treated condition— is clearly specified and measurable. When mandatory
disclosure is the “treatment” to be tested, however, we quickly depart from the drug-trial
ideal. Certain difficulties are common to all empirical testing of regulation, and indeed to
all empirical testing in the social sciences, but some are particular to, or exacerbated in, the
context of securities regulation.
For one thing, we lack a true control group.22 One could imagine a new disclosure
rule applying only to half of all public companies, with those subjected to the law
determined by lottery or a random number generator. While empiricists would no doubt
welcome such an optimized research design, obvious political concerns preclude the
possibility. Instead, securities laws apply to all companies, transactions, or actors satisfying
certain criteria, leaving no control group for empirical testing.
An alternative approach is to use the unregulated group most closely resembling the
regulated group as an ersatz control group. But of course, by definition the regulated and
unregulated groups have different ex ante characteristics, they are taken from different
samples, making any conclusions speculative. For example, municipal bonds, which are
exempt from mandatory disclosure, are often touted as a true counterpoint to (regulated)
corporate bonds.23 But the two markets cover very different types of issuers: governmental

In addition to the empirical projects reviewed in this Article, there is a considerable body of work testing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effects. Because the latter imposed additional disclosure obligations as well as significant
corporate governance-related changes on public companies, this literature is less useful in isolating the specific
impact of mandatory disclosure.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).
20. 15 U.S.C. §78o(d) (2012).
21. This Article takes the somewhat unusual approach o f grouping together under the rubric “mandatory
disclosure” (i) the specific disclosure rules for securities registration under the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter,
the ’33 Act], (ii) the on-going disclosure obligations for certain large issuers under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 [hereinafter, the ’34 Act], and (iii) the antifraud provisions applicable to securities issuers and
underwriters under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the ’33 Act and Rule 10b-5 of the ’34 Act. Rule 10b-5, for
example, though styled as an enforcement mechanism, functionally amounts to an additional information
disclosure requirement. By rendering issuers liable for failing to disclose material information if omitting to do
so would be misleading, Rule 10b-5 sets a floor on the information disclosed to investors and sets a standard
(“materiality”) for its content. While the ’33 Act and ’34 Act mandatory disclosure provisions differ in approach
from Rule 1Ob-5 by specifically listing the information to be disclosed and mandating its format, at base all three
sets of provisions mandate the production of material information by issuers for the benefit of investors.
22. This problem is not specific to securities regulation, but is common to virtually all empirical testing in
the social sciences.
23. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case fo r a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. R ev . 717, 744-46 (1984) (discussing obtaining “an inferential understanding of the impact of
mandatory disclosure” by looking “at the differences between the disclosure level within the public securities
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entities versus for-profit companies. Investors may well require significantly different
disclosure from municipalities than from private corporations, making any comparison
between the two groups tenuous.
A second-best approach to the pure drug-trial method is to compare the before-andaftcr results of introducing regulation solely for the treatment group. This “event study”
approach is taken by the vast majority of empirical studies of securities regulation.24 In his
seminal, though much criticized 1964 work, George Stigler compared the abnormal returns
and variance in returns of newly public companies from a pre-Depression period to those
in a post-Depression (and therefore post-mandatory disclosure) period.25 He found no
difference in return results between the two groups and a reduction in variance in the post
regulation group. On this basis, Stigler concluded that securities regulation had provided
no benefit to investors and had had the unfortunate side-effect of excluding small
companies from the market altogether.26
Unfortunately, the event study approach typically suffers from two major defects: (1)
the endogeneity of securities regulation effects, and (2) the duration and complexity of the
regulatory process.27 The first problem exists because changes in securities regulation
typically arise in response to significant changes in the markets (such as financial crises,
technological or financial innovation, etc.), complicating the task of isolating the effects of
securities regulation from other changes to the markets. Most notoriously, Stigler’s finding
of a reduction in stock-return variance following the birth of mandatory disclosure could
equally well be explained by the Great Depression itself, which put many high-risk, opaque
firms out of existence. The lengthy and complex regulatory process also complicates
empirical testing. Markets may react to potential legislation well before it is enacted,
making it difficult to pinpoint the correct “before” and “after” periods to isolate for
comparison.28 Due to these imperfections in research design, commentators have relied on

market subject to the SEC regulation and the level that prevails within the one major securities market that is
exempt from registration—the municipal bond market”).
24. See generally George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation o f the
Securities Exchange Act o f1934, 63 Am . Econ . Rev . 132 (1973) (examining the effects of the ’34 Act’s financial
disclosure requirements); Carol J. Simon, The Effect o f the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the
Performance o f New Issues, T9 Am . Econ . Rev . 295, 313 (1989) (examining the effects of the ’33 Act on firms’
stock returns); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation o f the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 120 (1964)
(examining the effects on new-issue stock returns before and after the SEC imposed mandatory disclosure). For
more recent work in this area, see generally Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences o f SEC
Disclosure Regulation: Evidencefrom the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & Econ . 233 (2005), examining firmspecific consequences of the SEC’s disclosure regulations on previously unregulated market segments.
25. Stigler, supra note 24, at 122.
26. Id. at 124.
27. J. Harold Mulherin, Measuring the Costs and Benefits o f Regulation: Conceptual Issues in Securities
Markets, 13 J. C orp . Fin . 421,424 (2007).
28. Alan Ferrell seems to have avoided this endogeneity problem in his study of the 1964 imposition of ’34
Act mandatory disclosure on companies whose stock traded on the over-the-counter (OTC) market. See generally
Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidencefrom the over-the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. 213 (2007). Fortuitously, the legislative change occurred at a time of relative calm in the markets. Id.
Ferrell interprets his findings of a reduction in volatility and positive abnormal stock returns as suggesting that
mandatory disclosure did provide investors some benefit. Id.
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the very same empirical studies to reach opposing conclusions as to the securities laws’
effectiveness.29
A final approach, of more recent vintage, is the cross-sectional regression analysis of
securities regulation’s effects (and particular components thereof) on the development of a
country’s stock market. Problems with this multi-country regression analysis include the
limited number of data points30 and, perhaps more troubling, the inherent ambiguity in the
direction of causation: do features such as mandatory disclosure explain the success of a
country’s securities markets, or is it the other way around? 31
B. Empirical Testing: Doctrinal Concerns— The Benefits and Costs o f Mandatory
Disclosure
Beyond these sampling and technical difficulties, the considerable uncertainty
regarding both the desired outcome and the possible side effects of the treatments to be
measured and modeled hamper empirical studies. Empirical testing of securities regulation
requires an economic theory of regulation—usually falling within either the public-interest
or the special-interest32 framework—as this framing determines the hypotheses to be
tested, the interpretation of the results, the burden of proof, the statistical power, and the
captured unintended consequences.33 What, then, are the benefits that the securities laws
aim to achieve, and what are their costs?
The securities laws’ possible benefits34 have been variously described. They include:
preventing unsophisticated investors from making risky investments,35 ensuring that

29. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Y ale
L.J. 2359, 2376 (1998) (relying on both Stigler and Benston for her claim that mandatory disclosure is not
effective); see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 Va . L. R ev . 1335 (1999) (reaching the opposite conclusion by critiquing Stigler, Benston, and
Simon); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms o f Market Efficiency, 70 V a . L. R ev .
549,636-38 (1984) (critiquing Benston’s conclusion that the 34 Act’s lack of impact on stock prices demonstrated
that the legislation had no beneficial effects).
30. The most frequently cited study, by La Porta et al., includes only 49 countries. See Rafael La Porta et
al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. F in . 1, 5 (2006).
31. Id. at 14. Other more technical criticisms of the approach taken in the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes &
Shleifer study involve (i) the construction of its indices and (ii) its reliance on the law on the books, rather than
as applied or circumvented over time by judges and practitioners. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson & Mark .1. Roe,
Public and Private Enforcement o f Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 209-10
(2009) (describing the problems with authority-based enforcement indexes); Paul G. Mahoney, The Development
o f Securities Law in the United States, A l J. A cct . Res . 325, 326 (2009) (stressing the distinction between law as
enacted and law as applied); Holger Spamann, The ‘‘A ntidirector Rights Index" Revisited, 23 R ev . Fin . STUD.
467, 470-72 (2010) (critiquing the construction of the La Porta et al. index).
32. See Richard A. Posner, Theories o f Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ . & Mgmt . SCI. 335, 343
(1974) (describing the special-interest theory of regulation).
33. Mulherin, supra note 27, at 421-22.
34. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure o f Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect
Paradigm o f Rule 10b-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. R ev . 1218, 1249-51 (1987) (giving an overview of key policy
justifications for the federal securities laws in general, and anti-fraud liability in particular).
35. Low net-worth, retail investors are effectively prohibited from investing in many financial assets,
including much o f private equity, hedge funds, and private debt issuances, under SEC rules that limit such
investments to accredited investors or qualified institutional buyers.

734

The Journal o f Corporation Law

[Vol. 39:4

investors are adequately informed before making risky investments,36 improving the
allocational efficiency of capital markets,37 preventing fraud by issuers and
intermediaries,38 correcting inefficiencies in the production of material investment
information,39 standardizing disclosure practices among issuers,40 controlling specific
managerial or promoter agency problems,41 and helping established firms create barriers
to entry for new firms.42 As will be discussed in Part V, in the case of mandatory
disclosure, the various goals fall within two broad categories. This whittling down still
does not ease the difficulty of the task in most cases, however, as the two candidates may
directly conflict with one another.43
Even if we agree on the goal and find evidence that it has been achieved, how should
we weigh the benefits of this outcome against the inevitable costs associated with it?
Securities regulation is not free:44 it imposes additional costs on issuers and other market
actors, and requires government expenditures on regulation and enforcement.45 Direct
private costs of mandatory disclosure include the time and effort of management, and direct
expenditures on underwriters, lawyers, and accountants.46 And the indirect costs of
mandatory disclosure likely exceed the direct costs. For example, the sizable direct costs
of mandatory disclosure may preclude small issuers from accessing the public markets for
financing, thereby increasing their cost of capital and skewing investment.47 Other indirect

36. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 24, at 120 (analyzing mandatory disclosure).
37. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev . 761, 802 (1985).
38. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation o f Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63
Law & CONTEMP. Probs. 11,12 (2000) (discussing the goals of securities regulation).
39. See generally Coffee, supra note 23.
40. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 700-01 (naming the federal securities regulation’s
features).
41. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev .
1047, 1048 (1995) (arguing that “the principal purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address certain agency
problems that arise between corporate promoters and investors, and between corporate managers and
shareholders”); see also Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory o f the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. Rev. 540,
598-99 (1995) (describing managerial disclosure requirements).
42. Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy o f the Securities Act o f1933, 30 J. Legal Stud. 1,18 (2001).
43. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 340 (noting that securities regulation’s two goals do not
always coincide).
44. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 708-09 (describing indirect costs).
45. To add to the difficulty of measuring the costs of mandatory disclosure, we cannot simply add up all of
the direct and indirect costs of disclosure, as this would significantly overstate the costs of regulation. Even in the
absence of any mandatory disclosure requirement, issuers will expend resources to disclose some information, in
order to attract investors. Id. at 682-83 (describing how firms have an interest in providing disclosure to
investors). Thus, the relevant costs of mandatory disclosure to be measured are the incremental costs incurred
under a mandatory disclosure regime. Id. at 708 (stating that the incremental costs of marginal disclosure might
be small, because issuers would disclose considerable information even in the absence of disclosure). This
requires a counter-factual guess as to what amount and type of information issuers would generate in the absence
of mandatory disclosure. Needless to say, this is a difficult task. Id. (stating that “[w]e do not know what things
firms would disclose, and to whom, in the absence of the securities laws.”).
46. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 367.
47. Stigler, supra note 24, at 122. Under a special-interest theory of regulation, this effect would be the goal
of mandatory disclosure, rather than an unintended consequence.
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costs include the additional delay and uncertainty in capital raising,48 the potential for
liability associated with any material disclosures,49 and the forced disclosure of sensitive
or proprietary company information to competitors.50
Some of these side effects may be directly antithetical to the original goals of
regulation: for example, if mandatory disclosure lulls unsophisticated investors into a false
sense of safety, 51 or leads to less monitoring and production of information by other market
actors, the securities laws may be counter-productive to the goal of helping investors make
better decisions.52 The profound difficulties with identifying and measuring the costs and
benefits of mandatory disclosure (and securities regulation in general) have led many to
conclude, along with Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson, that “[m]ost all of
securities regulation is educated guesswork rather than rigorous cost-benefit analysis
because we lack the ability to capture the full range of possible costs or benefits with
anything remotely resembling precision.” 53
What, then, do we know about whether mandatory disclosure is effective? In
summarizing the empirical and more conceptual tests of the securities laws’ effectiveness,
J. Harold Mulherin54 tentatively concludes that, on balance, securities regulation has not
provided demonstrable material benefits.55 Merritt Fox argues the opposite.56
Unfortunately, we appear to know very little.

48. See Cox, supra note 38, at 17-18 (describing indirect costs of mandatory disclosure).
49. Id. at 17.
50. See Fox, supra note 29, at 1345-46 (stating that private and social costs diverge). For general
discussions of the costs of mandatory disclosure, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 707-14, describing
costs and benefits of disclosure; see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory o f Disclosure Regulation
and Other Costs o f Disclosure, 58 Ala . L. Rev. 473, 479-85 (2007) (reviewing literature on costs and benefits
of disclosure).
51. See, e.g., Ripken, supra note 10, at 141-42 (stating that many believe the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms do
nothing more than “fooling investors into a false sense of confidence”).
52. This should only be the case if the market is not efficient, however, in the sense of incorporating all
public information into the stock price. In an efficient market, investors should be “protected” by mandatory
disclosure regardless of whether they are even aware of it. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
The Mechanisms o f Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Donald
C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits o f the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation,
97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135 (2002), for summaries of the competing views and evidence on market efficiency.
53. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 361. For much the same reasons, the D.C. Circuit’s recent
insistence on full-blown cost-benefit analyses for the SEC rulemaking has been widely critiqued by the legal
academy. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis o f Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, (Harvard Law School European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Working Paper No.
234/2014, 2014), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2375396 (providing case studies of regulation and their
implications for cost-benefit analysis); Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a
Framework o f Functionfs) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1983 (2013); James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom,
The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit's Usurpation o f SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 Tex.
L. Rev . 1811, 1840 (2012).
54. Mulherin, supra note 27, at 432.
55. See also Healy & Palepu, supra note 17, at 414 (concluding that “surprisingly little is known about why
financial reporting and disclosure is regulated in the capital market”).
56. Fox, supra note 29, at 1416 (concluding that disclosure serves several socially beneficial functions).

736

The Journal o f Corporation Law

[Vol. 39:4

III. L o a n s v s . B o n d s : T h e T r a d it io n a l P a r a d ig m s
A. Description o f Dichotomy
When a firm borrows money today, it can, in theory, select any point on a nearcontinuous range of more or less exotic debt instruments. But from the birth of developed
capital markets in the U.S. until only a few decades ago, the choice was largely confined
to one of two major paradigms: the private bank loan and the public bond. Traditional bank
loans tend to occupy the highest priority in a company’s capital structure: senior loans
secured by all of the company’s assets.57 Their terms are generally specified in loan or
credit agreements containing highly restrictive covenants, which give the bank both veto
rights over the borrower’s major corporate transactions (such as additional debt
incurrences, dividends, mergers, and major asset sales) and the ability to accelerate the loan
at the first hint of financial distress. Why would a company agree to such provisions? The
short answer is that, particularly for small, opaque companies, there may be no alternative
to bank funding.58 Because bank loans are usually secured by the company’s assets, and
banks are specialized in monitoring such idiosyncratic borrowers, banks can provide these
loans at relatively low interest rates.59 In exchange, they require tight controls over the
borrowing firm.60
Such bank loans thus necessarily involve long-term relationships between a given
bank and a given firm: the bank invests substantial resources on due diligence and ongoing
monitoring of the borrower,61 and the private information that it gleans through this
process cannot readily be transferred to other parties. As described here, a bank loan is
necessarily a wholly illiquid debt instrument. The originating bank will end up holding it
until maturity,62 simply because no other party will value it as much as the bank does:
potential third-party purchasers, lacking the bank’s private information about the borrower,

to

57. The Loan Syndications & Trading A ss ’n , T hrough the C ycle : Senior Secured Loans Poised
Perform 4 (2013), available at http://www.lsta.org/hubsub.aspx?id=70.

58. See Charles 1C. Whitehead, The Evolution o f Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate
Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 664 (2009) (noting that less information is available about private borrowers
than public ones).
59. See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51 Rev . Econ . Stud .
393, 393 (1984) (developing a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring
borrowers).
60. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever o f Corporate
Governance, 154 U. Pa . L. R ev . 1209, 1227-28 (2006) (discussing how loan covenants give lenders de facto
control over the borrower); Joel Houston & Christopher James, Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix o f
Private and Public Debt Claims, 51 J. Fin . 1863, 1866 (1996) (noting the significant control that lenders of private
debt exert over borrowing companies).
61. Monitoring might consist of examining the borrower’s collateral, testing compliance with the
covenants, reviewing the company’s financial statements, and meeting frequently with management.
62. See Standard & Poor ’s , A Guide to the Loan M arket 15 (2011), available at
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf (“In the old days . . . . [l]oans sat on the books of banks
and stayed there.”).
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will discount the value of the loan accordingly. This is the essence of private debt, or
relationship banking.63
At the other end of the spectrum from the small, opaque borrowers that classically
relied on bank loans, we have very large, mature companies with well-understood business
models and track records of providing reliable returns to their investors. Their cheapest
option for large borrowings will be to issue bonds to the general public. Due to their size
and established performance, retail investors are willing to purchase their bonds,
notwithstanding retail investors’ lack of incentives or ability to monitor the borrowing
companies directly.64 Traditional public bonds are longer-term (e.g., 30-year), unsecured
borrowings at fixed interest rates. As widely traded instruments underwritten by large
investment banks, bonds may be highly liquid instruments, in stark contrast to the
traditional bank loan. Finally, bond indentures typically contain significantly less
restrictive covenants than loan agreements.65
The private bank loan and the public bond have thus long been understood as opposing
paradigms of corporate debt financing. The senior secured bank loan “market” was almost
by definition perfectly illiquid and monopolized by banks. The unsecured bond market was
both deep and liquid, with a major retail-investor presence. Table 1 below summarizes the
traditional characteristics of loans and bonds described above.
Table 1. Traditional Characteristics of Bank Loans and Public Bonds

Lender
Liquidity
Lender Monitoring
Covenants
Credit Protection

Bank Loans

Public Bonds

Single bank
Very low
Intensive
Tight
Secured

Dispersed investors, including retail
High
Limited
Loose
Unsecured

B. Treatment Under the Securities Laws
If these traditional paradigms still held true for corporate loans and bonds, it would be
difficult to find fault with their opposing treatment under the federal securities laws. Bank
loans are the most commonly cited example of a non-security, while public bonds are very
clearly understood to be securities, and are therefore subject to mandatory disclosure,
among other requirements.66 The traditional bank loan is not viewed as requiring the

63.

See, e.g., Sreedhar T. Bharath et al., Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24 REV. Fin .

Stud. 1141, 1141-42 (2011) (explaining information asymmetry’s role in the development o f financial
intermediaries).
64. See Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure fo r Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L . REV. 447,
45 2 -6 9 (1999) (examining governance structures for corporate debt).
65. Infra Part IV.B.
66. The very first paragraphs o f the most widely used corporate finance textbook in business schools
worldwide include the following statement: “An ordinary bank loan is not a security . . . because it is held by the
bank and not sold or traded in financial markets . . . . The bond is a . . . security, because it can be held and traded
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protections of the federal securities laws, given that: retail investors play no part in the
corporate loan market; banks are themselves tightly regulated entities; credit agreements
provide significant contractual protections for the lender (covenants and collateral), making
them less risky—all else being equal—than bonds; and bank loans require substantial
monitoring by the lender.67 Moreover, compliance with the mandatory disclosure
provisions o f the securities laws would usually be impossible or excessively costly for the
small, opaque companies that tend to be the most common borrowers of bank loans.
In contrast, the paradigmatic public bonds are explicitly marketed to retail investors
as long-term investments and may be readily traded, arguably making the ongoing
availability of information about the issuer crucial. Clearly there can be no real expectation
of monitoring by retail investors. Thus, the publicly issued bond has historically been
viewed as demanding the mandatory disclosure apparatus.
IV . L o a n s v s . B o n d s : C o n v e r g e n c e

The contrasting paradigms of bank loans and public bonds persisted virtually
untouched for decades following the Securities Acts’ introduction of mandatory disclosure.
But over the last 30 years (and particularly the last 15), they have been turned on their
heads, primarily owing to radical changes in the bank loan market.68 The shift from
traditional relationship banking to the syndication and secondary trading of loans has been
both swift and sweeping.69 The gospel of the banking industry—that bank loans may not
be traded—was forgotten in a matter of years. And when the smoke cleared, the business
of commercial banking began to look much like the business of investment banking, and
the loan market began to resemble its erstwhile opposite, the bond market. Sub-parts A and
B below describe what brought about these changes and how they manifested.
A. Causes
1. Changes to the Loan Market
The seismic shifts in the corporate loan market were prompted by changes in both
companies’ demands for loans and creditors’ supply of capital to the loan market. On the
demand side, the appearance and rapid popularity of the leveraged buyout in the early
1980s significantly increased companies’ appetite for taking on debt.70 It also prompted a

by many investors in financial markets.” Richard A. Brealey et al„ Principles of Corporate Finance 2
(11th ed. 2014).
67. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 641—42 (affirming banks use covenants and monitoring to minimize
the risk of loss on their loans).
68. See id. at 651-52 (charting the decline in traditional banking in the last 30 years).
69. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 381—82 (describing the largest banks’ change in business model from
relationship banking to syndicated lending and securitization).
70. A leveraged buyout is a corporate acquisition in which the buyer, a “private equity” investment fund,
purchases a controlling stake in the target, using only a small portion of its own funds. Steven N. Kaplan & Per
Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121,121, 123-25 (2009). The bulk of the
purchase price (typically 60-90%) is funded by additional debt taken on by the target company at the time of the
transaction. Id. at 124.
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radical shift in companies’ understanding of the role of debt in their capital structure. Debt
had long been viewed as either something to avoid entirely or as a necessary evil to address
the business’s specific operational needs. With the advent of leveraged buyouts, however,
companies began taking on debt for non-operational reasons, that is, for shareholder-driven
reasons.71 With private equity in particular, debt became an end in itself: with higher
leverage, private equity firms could acquire ever-larger companies (that would otherwise
be immune to takeovers) and amplify returns to investors,72 while ensuring optimal
incentives to ensure their investments’ success. Leveraged-buyout targets thus drove a
substantial increase in the demand for large corporate loans.
The supply side of the corporate loan market experienced even greater upheavals over
this period. The end result was a complete reversal in the structure and composition of
corporate lending, best described as the shift from an “originate-and-hold” model to an
“originate-to-distribute” one.73 The initial prompt for this shift was the deregulation of the
banking industry, particularly the erosion of the divide between commercial banking
(taking deposits from customers and making commercial loans) and investment banking
(underwriting and trading securities). Coming on the heels of the Great Depression, the
Glass-Steagall Act74 aimed to make households’ bank deposits more secure by prohibiting
depositary banks from engaging in risky activities such as investment banking. While the
goal was to keep banks out of other financial sectors, it also had the effect of shielding the
banking business from competition from other financial institutions. But with the gradual
paring back of Glass-Steagall and its final repeal in 1999 (with the passage of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act75), the neat divide between commercial and investment banking
crumbled, and serious incursions were made across both sides of the aisle.
Now facing competition from insurance companies, investment banks, and mutual
funds banks were forced into new lines of business to maintain profits. To add to the banks’
woes, their traditional source of funds (consumer deposits) began to decline, as new
alternatives for households to safely place their money arose, such as money market funds.
Many banks fell by the wayside, and the industry as a whole experienced major
consolidation. On the lending side, investment banks began competing with bank loans by
offering companies new options for debt financing, such as issuing short-term commercial
paper.76
The major triggering event for change in the traditional loan funding model was the
shift in U.S. capital requirements for banks, best exemplified by the Revised Basel Capital
71. See Ulf Axelson et al., Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure o f Private Equity Funds, 64
J. Fin. 1549,1556 (2009) (explaining the incentives that drive leveraged buyout firms to maximize the use of debt
in acquisitions).
72. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes
in Corporate Takeovers, 76 Fordham L. Rev . 1975,1980 (2008) (describing how debt financing is an advantage
for leveraged-buyout firms over competing bidders for target companies).
73. Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, N ew En g . E con . Rev . 45, 45-46 (Jan.1993),
available at http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neer/neerl993/neerl93c.pdf.
74. The Glass-Steagall Act was the popular name for the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 162 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
75. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999) (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
76. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 654-55 (describing the evolution of the credit market).
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Accord (“Basel II”).77 With Basel II, bank regulators jumped with both feet onto the
bandwagon of modem portfolio theory and revised bank capital requirements so as to
incentivize banks to diversify their assets—until then a radical notion. Practically speaking,
banks were henceforth punished for holding a small number of large loans on their balance
sheets and rewarded for holding small portions of many loans. When the assets in question
were securities, diversification posed little problem for banks. But with loans, the pressing
question became: how could a bank hold a diversified portfolio of loans without originating
all of them? Further, how could a bank transfer large loans that it had originated off its
books? Recall that there was no real ability to parse and trade loans at the time. Thus, there
was urgent demand for a mechanism by which portions of corporate loans could be
offloaded from the originating bank to other banks and, eventually, to other types of
institutions.78
This is how the practice of loan syndication and secondary trading arose and quickly
became the world’s largest source of corporate financing.79 With loan syndication, a major
bank referred to as the lead arranger negotiates the key terms of the loan with the borrowing
company, and then organizes a syndicate o f lenders to fund it.80 Post-funding, if the loan
is large enough it will be traded to still other investors on a secondary market. Even the
lead arranger may end up holding only a small portion of the loan through this process, or
sell off its stake entirely.8' Thus, syndication and secondary trading introduced several
bond-like features to the loan market that were previously unimaginable: a dispersed lender
base of predominantly non-bank lenders, light monitoring, and liquidity. The bank’s role
in this brave new world shifted from funding, monitoring, and holding the loan (an
“originate-and-hold” model) to finding other investors for the loan and administering the
credit relationship (an “originate-to-distribute” model).82
While banks now hold an increasingly small share of corporate loans, non-bank
institutional investors have enthusiastically entered the market and rapidly surpassed banks

77. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International Convergence o f Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, B ank FOR International SETTLEMENTS (June
2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl07.htm (establishing what it calls more “risk-sensitive” capital
requirements). For a description of the impact of Basel II, see generally Robert F. Hugi et al., U.S. Adoption o f
Basel IIand the Basel IISecuritization Framework, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 45,48 (2008) (summarizing the final
rules the U.S. federal bank regulators issued “to implement the Basel II advanced internal rating-based approach
to bank capital adequacy in the United States”).
78. See Yener Altunbas et al ., Syndicated Loans: A Hybrid of Relationship Lending and
Publicly Traded Debt 102 (2006) (describing how syndicated loans enable banks and other financial
institutions to satisfy their capital requirements and diversify their portfolios).
79. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side o f Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins
o f the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 C onn . L. Rev . 963, 982 (2009).
80. See Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evolution o f the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets,
in T he Handbook of Loan Syndications and T rading 21, 23-24 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds.,
2007) (explaining the origin and growth of the syndicated loan market).
81. For descriptions of loan syndication, see Victoria Ivashina & Zheng Sun, Institutional Demand Pressure
and the Cost o f Corporate Loans, 99 J. Fin. Econ. 500, 503-08 (2011); Wilmarth, supra note 79, at 981-82.
82. The latter function has proved highly lucrative for the major investment and commercial banks that
dominate the lead arranger market. See Barry Bobrow et al., The Primary Market, in The Handbook OF LOAN
Syndications and T rading 155, 172 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007) (stating that the top three
lead arrangers together covered 47% of the total syndicated loan market in 2005).
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in market share.83 In particular, securitization vehicles referred to as collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs) now hold up to 60% of the market.84 Other institutional investors in
the loan market include pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies,
finance companies, and foreign institutions.85
2. Changes to the Bond Market
While the bond market was less uprooted than the loan market over this period, there
were nonetheless two key developments that contributed to its convergence with the loan
market. First, the early 1980s witnessed the development of a high-risk segment of the
market, the high-yield (or so-called “junk bond”) market. Once again prompted by the
leveraged-buyout appetite for large debt financing, Michael Milken at now-defunct
investment bank Drexel Burnham and Lambert introduced a new debt product to the public,
bonds promising very high yields and used to finance takeovers and other leveraged
recapitalizations.86 Bonds were no longer the exclusive province of blue-chip, lowleverage borrowers.
Second, the direct retail investor gradually began to withdraw from the bond
markets.87 Retail investors have been receding to varying degrees in all of the public
markets, primarily because their participation is now funneled through intermediaries such
as mutual funds and pension funds.88 Yet the phenomenon is even more pronounced in the
corporate bond markets, where the direct retail investor has now all but disappeared. There
are several plausible explanations for why this might be so. First, unlike the equity markets,
corporate bonds are now traded almost exclusively through dealers,89 rather than on
exchanges, making access difficult for direct retail investors. Second, the institutional
demand for fixed-income products is so great that there is little incentive to court or even

83. Glenn Yago & Donald McCarthy, The U.S. Leveraged Loan Market: A Primer, Milken Inst. 26-27
(2004), available at https://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/loan_primer_1004.pdf (describing how prime funds,
CLOs, finance companies, and insurers have replaced banks as the secondary markets’ major investor).
84. Through the process of securitization, pieces of many different syndicated loans are packaged into a
single vehicle, which then issues different tranches of securities to investors, thus enabling them to invest in a
diversified portfolio of loans relatively cheaply.
85. Bartlett, supra note 72, at 2013.
86. See Glenn Yago, Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America
20-26 (1991) (describing the history of the “junk bond revolution”).

87. See James D. Cox et al ., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 560 (7th ed. 2013)
(“[Bjond markets are almost exclusively an institutional medium, i.e., retail investors compose a very small
percentage of bond trading.”).
88. See Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem For the Retail Investor? 95 VA. L. Rev . 1105, 1105 (2009) (stating
that retail investors account for less than 2% of NYSE’s trading volume); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail
Investors, and the Institutionalization o f the Securities Markets, 95 V a . L. Re v . 1025, 1026 n.4 (2009) (noting
that the total value of securities that households own directly has not declined).
89. Cox ET AL., supra note 87, at 560.
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accommodate the retail investor.90 As one example, the minimum denominations for bond
purchases are significantly larger than for stock.91
An astonishing feature of the various triggers for change in the loan and bond markets
is that none involved a change in the treatment of either loans or bonds under the securities
laws.92 The loan market went from an illiquid, bank-driven market to a full-fledged,
disintermediated capital market without any loosening or tightening of the securities laws.
B. Evidence
The changes to the loan and bond markets described above have resulted in a striking
and rapid convergence, particularly at the riskiest end of the spectrum in each. Both
investors and issuers now view leveraged loans, which are loans to borrowers that have a
high proportion of debt in their capital structure (such as private equity-owned companies),
as substitutes for high-yield bonds.93 This convergence manifests most strikingly in their
respective investors, pricing, liquidity, covenants, and credit features.
1. Investors
As discussed above, the number and type of creditors for corporate loans has changed
dramatically as a direct result of the syndication and secondary trading of loans. Syndicated
loans are held by large groups of dispersed creditors, consisting primarily of non-bank
institutional investors having no relationship with the borrowing company.94 Given the
gradual disappearance of the direct retail investor, the bond market is also now dominated
by institutional investors.95 While loans and bonds began with dramatically different
creditors, they now overlap very significantly, particularly in the high-yield space.
2. Pricing
The pricing of the loan and bond markets has converged as well, and over a very short
period of time.96 Using data from the late 1980s and early 1990s, Angbazo, Mei and
Saunders found that leveraged loan pricing had not yet integrated with high-yield bond

90. For regulatory or other prudential reasons, institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds
have a strong preference for debt products over equity.
91. See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 4, at 221 (describing institutional investors’ domination of
the corporate bond market).
92. The promulgation of Rule 144A did have an indirect effect on the loan market in that it opened the door
for a new class of creditors, securitization vehicles such as CLOs. But the Securities Acts’ regulation of loans
remained unchanged.
93. See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 4, at 230.
94. In 2012, U.S. banks held only 6.3% of U.S. leveraged loans, while CLOs and loan funds together held
80.7%. Structured Finance Industry Group, Credit Risk Retention Re-Proposal F-9 (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2013/December/20131219/R-1411/R1411J03013_111495_377905725574_l.pdf
95. See COX ET AL., supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing the withdrawal of retail investors
from bond markets).
96. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 379 (noting how banks “price and market” loans and bonds in a similar
manner).
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pricing.97 Revisiting the question with more recent data, Thomas and Wang find significant
integration of the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets, with pricing in the two
markets very clearly moving together.98
3. Liquidity
Perhaps the most striking and surprising evidence of convergence is the development
of a liquid leveraged loan market, when corporate loans were for so long the consummate
illiquid investment. Not all syndicated loans are traded, but large leveraged loans are
specifically designed to be traded.99 Figure 1 below depicts the surge in trading volume for
leveraged loans from the early 1990s through the post-financial crisis period. While pricing
in the two markets is now integrated, the leveraged loan market’s trading volume has in
fact recently surpassed the high-yield market’s.100

97. Lazarus A. Angbazo et al., Credit Spreads in the Market for Highly Leveraged Transaction Loans, 22
J. Banking & Fin. 1249,1249 (1998).
98. Hugh Thomas & Zhiqiang Wang, The Integration o f Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk Bond Markets,
28 J. Banking & Fin. 229, 306 (2004).
99. There are various measures of liquidity, but one useful proxy for the liquidity of a given company’s
debt is simply the size (principal amount) of the loan in question. Martin S. Fridson & Jeffrey A. Bersh, Measuring
Liquidity Premiums in the High- Yield Bond Market, in The Yearbook OF FIXED Income INVESTING 84, 89 (John
D. Finnerty & Martin S. Fridson eds., 1995). By this measure, the syndicated loan market is liquid indeed—multibillion-dollar issuances are now routine.
100. The Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n , Through the Cycle: Senior Secured Loans Poised
to Perform, supra note 57, at 14.
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Figure 1. Leveraged Loan Trading Volume 101

4. Covenants
The once-universal truth that loans come saddled wi:h tight covenants and intensive
creditor monitoring is also proving false, and syndication and secondary trading are again
the culprits. While bank loans were always characterized by highly restrictive covenants,
this feature could not peacefully coexist with funding by dispersed, unrelated creditors.102
Tight bank loan covenants often must be amended over ihe course of Tie loan, which is
easy when the loan is between a single bank and borrower. So long as the bank approves
of the proposed amendment, it can be effected almost immediately. With a dispersed
creditor base, however, collective action and holdout problems among the creditors make
amendments difficult, time-consuming, and often very costly. If the costs are too great, the
company might be prevented from pursuing value-creating projects or pushed into
bankruptcy unnecessarily. In order to avoid this problem ex ante, covenants must be less
restrictive, thereby requiring fewer amendments ex post. This explains why bond covenants

101. Secondary Loan Market Volume—US, THOMSON REUTERS L?C, hhps://www.loanpricing.com/ (last
visited Jul. 14,2014).
102. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 378 (noting that syndicated loans have fewer covenants than traditional
bank loans).
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were traditionally looser than bank loan covenants,103 and why the latter have loosened
dramatically since the onset of loan syndication and trading.104
The adoption and rapid proliferation of “covenant-lite” loans is the most discussed
(and criticized) manifestation of the loosening of covenants in leveraged loans.105 A
covenant-lite loan does not prohibit the borrower from exceeding a specified leverage ratio,
whether by taking on additional debt or simply through deteriorating performance.106 Such
a leverage covenant is emblematic of traditional bank loans, as it gives the lender
significant control over the borrower’s capital structure. In addition, it amounts to a tripwire
that provides the lender with an early warning signal of potential financial distress. If a
borrower violates the leverage covenant, the bank may be able to intervene in the
borrower’s operations early enough to stave off insolvency, or the bank can decide to
accelerate and exit the loan before the situation worsens. With covenant-lite loans, as with
public bonds, lenders entirely relinquish this control over the borrower.
Covenant-lite loans first appeared in and around 2005, and rapidly became popular in
the leveraged loan market. Because financial covenants were a defining feature of bank
loans for so long, covenant-lite loans were dismissed as a sign of lender excess in the prefinancial-crisis period that would quickly be abandoned when cooler heads prevailed.107
Yet covenant-lite loans’ market share has continued to surge post-crisis, representing up to
35% of all leveraged loans outstanding in 2013.108 With the loosening of loan covenants
generally, and the proliferation of covenant-lite loans in particular, leveraged loans are now

103.

See Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Private Versus Public Lending: Evidence From Covenants, in
of Fixed Income Investing 253,253-74 (John D. Finnerty & Martin S. Fridson eds., 1995)
(noting one of the author’s findings that “private debt covenants require more monitoring and necessitate more
frequent renegotiation than public debt”); Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing o f
Corporate Debt Covenants 13 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=466240 (stating that “[i]t is clear that private debt contains far more covenants than does
public debt”).
104. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 643^15 (describing the expansion of loan syndication and trading).
105. See Cent Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Role o f Private Equity Group Reputation in LBO
Financing, 96 J. Fin. Econ. 306, 306-09 (2010) (describing the trend of declining financial covenants associated
with leveraged loans).
106. See Standard & Poor ’s , A G uide to the Loan M arket , supra note 62 at 18 (defining the term
“covenant-lite loan”).
107. You Only Give Me Your Funny Paper: Debt Markets Turn Grouchy as Creditors Ask fo r More, THE
ECONOMIST (June 28, 2007), available at http://www.economist.com/node/9413745 (describing covenant-lite
loans entered into prior to the financial crisis as a temporary trend “that in more sober times would have had
lenders reaching for the Alka-Seltzer”).
108. Bram Smith et al., Loan Terms & Ways to Invest in Loans, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASS’N,
available at http://www.lsta.org/workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=16747 (citing figures from Standard &
Poor’s LCD). In February 2013 alone, the issuance of covenant-lite loans reached nearly fifty billion dollars in
the U.S. leveraged loan market. C olm Doherty & H ugo P ereira , Thompson R euters LPC, Leveraged
Loan
M onthly :
September
2013
11
(2013),
available
at
http://share.thomsonreuters.com/loanpricing/LoanMonthly/LoanInvestorMthly_September2013.pdf
The Y earbook
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frequently described as having “bond-style” covenants,109 and are drafted with virtually
identical language and substance.110

5. Credit Features
Finally, leveraged loans are converging with high-yield bonds in their most basic
credit features. While traditional bank loans tended to be issued as either revolving loans
or as amortizing term loans, leveraged loans are predominantly structured as non
amortizing (or minimally amortizing) term loans, similar to bonds.**111 The tenor (or
maturity) of leveraged loans and high-yield bonds is also now very similar, overlapping in
the range of six to eight years.112
Two particularly significant differences between leveraged loan and high-yield bond
facilities remain, however, both of which tend to make leveraged loans somewhat less
risky, all else being equal. First, bonds still tend to provide for fixed interest, while
leveraged loans generally pay out floating-rate interest, such that leveraged loan investors
are not subject to interest rate risk. Second, it is still the case that leveraged loans tend to
be secured by the borrower’s assets, while most bonds are unsecured.113 Yet here too,
change is afoot—secured bond issuances have surged in recent years.114 And on the loan
front, a new product, the second-lien loan, has proven wildly popular with non-bank
investors.115 While the borrower’s assets secure such loans, they have second priority after
the first-lien debt, and are thus highly unlikely to be fully repaid if the borrower becomes
insolvent. Thus, they skirt the line between unsecured debt and secured debt very closely,
and accordingly pay higher interest spreads than traditional bank debt.116 At the current
state of convergence of the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets, we are left with
two products that are virtually identical from a functional standpoint. Table 2 summarizes
the above by comparing the traditional loan and bond paradigms with the current highyield bond and leveraged loan markets.

109. See Standard & Poor ’s, A Guide to the Loan M arket , supra note 62, at 18 (describing the bond
like covenants o f covenant-lite loans).
110. For the seminal explanation o f covenants’ functions in debt agreements, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr. &
Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis o f Bond Covenants, 7 J. Fin . E con . 117, 118-19 (1979).
111. See Standard & Poor ’s , A Guide to the Loan M arket , supra note 62, at 16-17 (describing term
loans).
112. See Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC, High Yield Bond Primer, H ighyieldbond .com ,
http://www.highyieldbond.com/primer/ [hereinafter Standard & Poor’s, High Yield Bond Primer] (noting that
most high-yield bonds mature in seven to ten years) (last visited June 1, 2014).
113. See George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory o f Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 80 V a . L.
Re v . 2155,2159 (1994) (describing the effect o f secured debt on management behavior).
114. See Standard & Poor’s, High Yield Bond Primer, supra note 112 (charting the increase in the share of
secured high-yield bond issuances since 2005).
115. For a description o f second-lien loans, see Standard & P oor ’s , A Guide to the Loan M arket ,
supra note 62, at 17-18.
116. See Standard & P oor ’s , A Guide to the Loan M arket , supra note 62, at 17 (noting that the
interest-rate spread between second-lien and first-lien loans typically ranges from 200 to 1000 basis points).
Another oft-noted difference between loans and bonds is that bond indentures are, in principle, enforced by a
trustee on behalf of the noteholders. In practice, however, bond trustees do not engage in any independent
monitoring of borrowers, and serve merely to administer the credit relationship and coordinate noteholder actions.
See Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma o f the Indenture Trustee, 59 A la .
L. Rev . 1037, 1044 (2008) (highlighting the largely ministerial role o f bond trustees).
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Table 2. Leveraged Loan and High-Yield Bond Convergence
Traditional
Bank Loans

Traditional
Public Bonds

Leveraged Loans and HighYield Bonds

Lender

Single bank

Liquidity
Lender
Monitoring
Covenants
Credit
Protection

Very low
Intensive

Dispersed
investors, including
retail
High
Limited

Dispersed investors;
institutional only (and mostly
non-bank)
High
Limited

Tight
Secured

Loose
Unsecured

Intermediate
Leveraged loans:
predominantly secured, with
second-lien loans increasing
High-Yield bonds:
predominantly unsecured, but
secured bonds increasing in
market share

C. Are Syndicated Loans Securities?
Notwithstanding their functional convergence with public bonds, corporate loans that
are syndicated and traded continue to be treated as non-securities under U.S. law, thereby
avoiding all disclosure requirements thereunder. In the public bond market, mandatory
disclosure in practice means that the initial bond issuance must be offered to the public by
means of a detailed registration statement that frequently runs in the hundreds of pages.
Post-funding, the issuer may still be subject to ongoing disclosure requirements, even if it
is a private company, so long as the bonds have at least 300 holders of record.117 Finally,
the issuance is subject to various antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts including most
significantly Rule 10b-5.118 The loan market avoids these entirely. Instead, leveraged loans
tend to be marketed to investors with slim “bank books” containing a short term-sheet for
the credit facility and management projections.119 The only additional disclosure
requirements to which the borrower is subject are contractual ones—the covenants for
which lenders negotiate in the credit agreement.120 But in light of the rise of syndicated

117.
118.

15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
See Standard & Poor’s , A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 9 (describing a bank

119.
book’s typical content).

120. Unlike shareholders, creditors are not owed fiduciary duties by directors or officers, unless the company
becomes insolvent. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101-03
(Del. 2007) (“[T]he creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims against
directors . . . .” (emphasis in the original)); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns, 621 A.2d 784, 787-88 (Del. Ch. 1992)
(“[T]he general rule is that directors do not owe creditors duties beyond the relevant contractual terms absent
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lending and secondary trading of loans, is the regulatory distinction between loans and
bonds defensible under the law?
1. The Reves Framework
The Securities Act’s remarkably expansive definition of a “security” includes any
“note, . . . bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,. . . investment contract,. . . or any
certificate of interest or participation in . . . any of the foregoing.” 121 The Securities Acts
do not treat all promissory notes or debt instruments as securities, however. The foregoing
definition’s laundry-list of instruments is subject to the equally expansive caveat “unless
the context otherwise requires,” leaving to the courts the task of determining the
definition’s actual contours.122
The judicial analysis of whether a particular debt instrument is a security proceeds in
what is by now a well-established order. In Reves v. Ernst & Young,123 the Supreme Court
adopted the Second Circuit’s “family resemblance” test, which begins with a presumption
that every note is a security, in light of the all-encompassing Securities Act definition.124
This presumption may be rebutted, however, if the note strongly resembles one of the
families of instruments previously determined by the courts to be non-securities, all
according to the following four factors:
(1) “[T]he motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into”
the transaction;
(2) “[T]he ‘plan of distribution’ o f the instrument;]”
(3) “[T]he reasonable expectations of the investing public[;]” and
(4) “[W]hether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the
Securities Acts unnecessary.” 125
If the note in question does not sufficiently resemble one of the families of non
securities, the court must determine whether to create a new category of non-security,
employing the same four-factor analysis.126 The note is deemed a security if it fails both
tests. In addition to clarifying the analysis for debt instruments, the Reves Court reiterated
the long-held view that traditional bank loans should not be subject to securities regulation,

special circumstances. . . e.g., fraud, insolvency, or a violation of a statute___”) (internal quotes omitted); Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1155-57
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that when facing insolvency, a board does not breach its fiduciary duties by
placing the corporate enterprise interests before shareholders).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l) (2012) (providing the Securities Act o f 1933’s definition of a “security”). Note,
however, that the definition of a “security” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not include the words
“evidence of indebtedness.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012).
122. 15 U.S.C. § § 77b(a), 78c(a) (2012).
123. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990), reh 'g denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990).
124. Id. at 63, 65.
125. Id. at 66-67.
126. Id. at 67.
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noting that “notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current operations” are among
the categories o f non-securities.127
2. Banco Espanol
The question of whether syndicated loans in their current incarnation are securities
has not yet come before the courts. The case that is thought to be authoritative on this
question, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank, 128 deals with their
precursor—loan participations.129 Syndicated loans are traded on the secondary market by
assignment, which transfers all of the rights and duties of the assignor lender to a new
lender. In contrast to a loan assignment, a loan participation is merely a promise by an
existing lender to distribute its share (or a portion of its share) of all principal and interest
payments on the loan to a third party.130
At issue in Banco Espanol was a loan participation program in which Security Pacific,
a nationally chartered bank, solicited various investors to purchase participations in
unsecured, short-term loans that it had originated to a financial service company, Integrated
Resources, Inc. When Integrated began defaulting on its loans, the purchasers of the loan
participations, having no recourse against the borrower,131 sued Security Pacific for failing
to disclose material facts about Integrated’s financial condition as required by Section
12(2) of the Securities Act.132 The success of such a claim depended on a finding that the
participations were, in fact, securities.
The first question the court tackled was how to treat the loan participation in relation
to the loan itself for purposes of the securities laws. Here, the court noted with approval
the district court’s conclusion that, while “a participation in an instrument might in some

127. Id. at 65 (quoting Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1984), cert,
denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984)).
128. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 509 U.S.
903 (1993).
129. Id. at 53. Loan participations became popular before the current practice of fully transferring loans by
assignment. See Robert F. Komegay, Jr., Bank Loans as Securities: A Legal and Financial Economic Analysis o f
the Treatment o f Marketable Bank Assets under the Securities Acts, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 799, 825 (1993) (charting
the rise of loan participations).
130. See Richard Wight et al., The LTSA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide 507,507-08 (2009)
(discussing the difference between assignments and participations). Loan participations were a convenient way
of transferring the risk of loans off banks’ balance sheets without requiring them to actually assign the loans. The
lender effectively acts as a pass-through, sending proceeds from the loan received from the borrower directly to
the purchaser of the loan participation. Because the loan participant is not in contractual privity with the borrower,
it generally has no voting rights under the loan agreement, no direct recourse to the borrower’s assets in the event
of default, and no other traditional lender powers. Id. Most importantly from the perspective of the securities laws,
perhaps, is the fact that the purchaser of the loan participation receives only the information that the lender
contracts to share with it, which may be less than what the borrower is required to provide to the lender under the
loan agreement. Id.
131. See id. (stating that the holder of a loan participation is not in contractual privity with the borrowing
company).
132. Banco Espanol de Credito v. SEC Pac., Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also ’33
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2014).
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circumstances be considered a security even where the instrument itself is not[,]” 133 in this
case the loan participation “did not have an identity separate from the underlying loan.” 134
This conclusion alone is puzzling, given that the loan agreement was a contract between
the borrower, Integrated, and the original lender, Security Pacific, while the participation
was solely between Security Pacific and the purchasers, and had wholly different terms.135
Specifically, the purchasers did not have the lenders’ rights under the loan agreement, and
in particular did not have access to information about the borrower that other lenders
did.136
In a relatively cursory opinion, a majority of the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s judgment that the loan participations were not securities for purposes o f the
Securities Acts, concluding that the loan participations bore a “family resemblance” to
loans by commercial banks to their customers for current operations, a well recognized
category of non-securities.137 Specifically, the court agreed with the district court’s
conclusions under the four-factor Reves test that: first, the parties’ primary motivation was
commercial; second, the plan of distribution did not resemble that of securities because
“only institutional and corporate entities were solicited” and resales were prohibited
without Security Pacific’s consent; third, the investing public would reasonably have
perceived that these were participations in loans rather than investments; and fourth,
another regulatory scheme mitigated the need for securities regulation, because the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) had issued policy guidelines for the sale of
loan participations.138
In a strong dissent, the Chief Judge agreed with the SEC’s amicus brief that the loan
participations were securities because they differed from traditional loan participations in
at least four key respects: (1) the nature and number of the purchasers, (2) the purchasers’
purpose, (3) the marketing of the loan participations, and (4) the information made

133. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 54 (citing Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp.
36,41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
134. Id. (citing Banco Espanol, 763 F. Supp. 36,42 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
135. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
136. Id. at 38.
137. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55-56.
138. Id. at 54. Surprisingly, the court did not address whether the loan participations were securities in the
form of “investment contracts,” the analysis for which is set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Pre-Reves cases had rejected arguments that loan participations or syndications were “investment contracts,” on
the theory that interest on a loan is not the type of “profit” associated with an investment purpose. See McVay v.
W. Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395, 1400 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that a participant in a loan agreement held
no interest in loan funds, the note, or mortgages other than “bare legal title”). But in SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S.
389 (2004), the Supreme Court cast doubt on the continued validity of these cases, by holding that for purposes
of the investment contract test, “profits” does not require something akin to an equity interest; a fixed interest
(such as interest on a loan) may suffice. See Edwards, 540 U.S. at 897-99 (holding that contract yielding a fixed
rate of return can be a security). The Reves test was intended to supplant more ffee-form analyses such as the
Howey test for “investment contracts” in the specific case of debt instruments. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (rejecting
other courts’ application of the Howey test to notes). Yet the Howey lineage of cases strongly informed Reves,
and is still thought to constitute an additional test that a debt instrument must fail before it can be conclusively
ruled a non-security. In fact, Fox v. Dream Trust, 743 F. Supp. 2d 389,398 (2d Cir. 2010) states that certain loan
participations may potentially constitute notes that are securities and investment contracts. See Fox, 743 F. Supp.
2d at 398 (finding that the participation agreement at issue was a security and an investment contract).

2014]

The Rise o f the Leveraged Loan Market

751

available to the purchasers.139 First, although some banks purchased the loan
participations, there were also many “non-financial entities” seeking to make an
investment.140 Second, a sales desk at Security Pacific within its trading department (rather
than its commercial loan department) ran the loan participation program.141 Third,
promotional materials portrayed the loan participations as competitive with commercial
paper (which is undeniably a security), referred to the purchasers as “investors,” and
emphasized the ability to trade the loan notes.142 Finally, the purchasers did not receive
any nonpublic information about the borrowers at issue, thereby sharply distinguishing
them from commercial lenders and placing them in a significantly less well-informed
position than the original lender, Security Pacific.143
The majority opinion is indeed misleading in describing the loan participation
program as a small number of private, fully negotiated arrangements between Security
Pacific and a select group of purchasers regarding a specific commercial loan. Security
Pacific’s loan notes program was far broader than the loan participations at issue in this
case: it covered 100-250 borrowers and involved 600-700 investors at the time.144
Moreover, purchasers did not approach Security Pacific with respect to Integrated’s loan
specifically; rather, the trading desk at Security Pacific would solicit investors through
daily calls (some of which were “cold calls”) regarding any number of different loans.145
If the majority opinion holds on even these facts, the ruling is broad indeed and
exempts a large swath of trading programs related to instruments formally designated as
loans. While subsequent cases have interpreted Banco Espanol narrowly,146 it has not been
overturned and is widely considered to apply to both loan participations and syndicated
loan assignments.147 Yet, the court decided Banco Espanol in 1992, at a time when the
syndicated loan market was on the cusp of its rapid expansion, and had not reached
anywhere near its current level of depth and liquidity. While there is a strong case to be
made that Banco Espanol was wrongly decided at the time, we are still left with the
question of whether it is good law in light of the interim changes to the loan market. In
particular, how do syndicated loans fare today under a Reves analysis?

139. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 56 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 57.
142. Id at 58.
143. Id
144. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 58 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 57.
146. See Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 815 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding, on a limited set of
facts, that passive investors in a participation agreement were protected by federal securities laws). Decided only
a year after Banco Espanol, the Second Circuit’s Pollack decision concluded that unsecured mortgage
participations marketed to passive individual investors were securities under the Securities Acts. Id. Oddly, the
court did not overturn Banco Espanol, despite upending its key underpinnings. Infra Part IV.C.3.
147. See generally Syndicated Loans as Securities, Proskauer Rose LLP (2011), available at
http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/broker-dealer/Syndicated-Loans-as-Securities.pdf (discussing the
framework for determining whether syndicated loans are securities and including a discussion of Banco Espanol).
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3. Reves Applied to Syndicated Loans
We begin by applying the four Reves factors to syndicated loans.148
The first Reves factor looks to whether the parties’ motivations were investment
(which would weigh in favor of treatment as a security) versus commercial or consumer
(which would weigh in favor of treatment as a non-security).149 The Banco Espanol
majority made much o f the fact that Security Pacific was primarily in the business of
making commercial loans, but only a year later, the court acknowledged that the primary
focus should be on the motivation of the purchaser of the instrument.150 Specifically, a
buyer’s investment motivation trumps a seller’s commercial motivation.151
Purchasers in the leveraged loan market regularly describe themselves as investors,
rather than as lenders.152 Aside from the lead arranger, members of the syndicate generally
have no relationship or even contact with the borrower, and they do not view their efforts
or input as affecting the borrower’s success.153 In the leveraged loan space, their
expectation is clearly to be able to trade their loan holdings on a liquid market.154 All of
these bespeak an investment, rather than commercial, objective. Turning to the borrower,
in a leveraged loan transaction, the borrowing company is rarely seeking funds for current
operations. Instead, banks fill such needs via revolving lines of credit.155 Leveraged loans
are typically used for shareholder-specific reasons (such as to issue dividends to
shareholders) or to make new investments (such as acquisitions).156 Finally, although lead

148. As a preliminary matter, it is worth distinguishing broadly between two types of syndicated loans: the
revolving loan and the term loan. Revolving loans are borrowings under a line o f credit that is kept open for the
company for a defined period, and which may be borrowed, repaid, and re-borrowed up to the credit limit at any
time. See Standard & Poor ’s, A G uide to the Loan M arket , supra note 62, at 16. Such lines o f credit are
typically used for short-term operational needs. Id. at 7. Term loans, in contrast, are typically multi-year loans
that are borrowed entirely upfront only once and repaid only at maturity. Id. at 16 (noting that term loans generally
involve a series o f repayments or a single lump sum repayment). Syndicated revolving loans continue to be funded
exclusively by banks, which have the capacity to keep such lines of credit open at very low interest rates, and are
significantly less risky than term loans. Id. at 10 (noting that banks generally provide unfunded revolving credits).
Thus, though they are syndicated, revolving loans still resemble the archetypal bank loan in many respects, thus
arguing for their treatment as non-securities. In contrast, syndicated term loans have experienced the most
dramatic change, as they are now funded primarily by non-banks and involve greater levels of risk and less
monitoring and creditor protection. See supra Part [V.B (describing changes to the syndicated loan market). Thus,
for the remainder o f this discussion, “syndicated loans” will refer exclusively to syndicated term loans, for which
the treatment as non-securities is the weakest.
149. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63-65 (1990) (discussing the “investment v. commercial” test
and noting its similarity to the “family resemblance” test which was adopted).
150. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the buyer
appellant’s motivation to invest indicated the note was a security despite the sellers motivation).
151. Id.
152. See Standard & Poor ’s, A G uide to the Loan M arket , supra note 62, at 10 (describing the various
participants in the “loan investor market”).
153. See Simons, supra note 73, at 46 (describing the lead arranger as an intermediary between the borrower
and the rest of the syndicate).
154. See Standard & Poor ’s , A Guide to the Loan M arket , supra note 62, at 15 (describing the role
played by liquidity in loan pricing).
155. See supra note 148.
156. See Fox v. Dream Trust, 743 F. Supp. 2d 389, 399 (2010) (noting that these features point towards an
investment motivation).
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arranger positions continue to be filled by large investment or commercial banks, their role
in such capacity is not to fund companies’ operations. Lead arrangers are in the business
of collecting fees for performing what is effectively an underwriting function, and should
therefore not be viewed as lenders. 157
The second Reves factor, the plan of distribution, considers the manner in which a
debt instrument is marketed and sold, and to whom. Whereas traditional bank loans are
private, bilateral, long-term agreements between a single company and its relationship
bank, syndicated loans are distributed much like public securities. First, the number of
creditors can be very large, whether at the initial syndication or through subsequent trading
and securitization. Second, they are marketed widely by the lead arranger’s syndication
desk, rather than the commercial lending desk . 158 The loan’s origination is thus divorced
from the loan’s distribution. The purchasers of leveraged loans are primarily non-banks—
that is, institutions unable to closely monitor borrowers and with very different
objectives. 159 CLOs, the primary purchasers of leveraged loans, exist solely to hold
investments. 160 All of these weigh heavily in favor of treatment as securities.
Only two features leveraged loan distribution differ from a classic public distribution
of securities. First, although trading in the leveraged loan market is heavy (and in fact
heavier than for high-yield bonds), it is still the case that the borrower’s consent is typically
required for any assignment of the loan . 161 Flowever, credit agreements for leveraged loans
routinely provide that the borrower may not unreasonably withhold consent, and if the
borrower fails to respond to a request for consent within a specified number of days, it is
deemed to have acquiesced to the assignment. 162 Second, leveraged loans are marketed
only to institutional investors, and never to direct retail investors. 163 Yet the Reves Court
confirmed that offerings to sophisticated parties may nonetheless amount to public
distribution. 164 Indeed, direct retail investors are absent from the high-yield bond market
as well, and high-yield bonds very clearly continue to be regulated as securities.
Under the third Reves factor, an instrument may be characterized as a security
notwithstanding its underlying economics if the “reasonable perception of the instrument
by the investing public” is that of an investment. 165 Because leveraged loans are explicitly
marketed as investments, the purchasers of such loans describe themselves as investors,
and they are risky commitments of capital for at least several years, it would be difficult to

157. Victoria Ivashina & Anna Kovner, The Private Equity Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and
Relationship Banking, 24 REV. Fin . STUD. 2462,2464 (2011) (noting the appeal of fee income for lead arrangers).
158. See Wilmarth, supra note 16, at 379 (“The growing importance of institutional investors has caused
lead banks to price and market their syndicated loans in a manner similar to corporate bonds.”).
159. See Yago & McCarthy, supra note 83, at 26-27 (discussing how initially banks dominated the
secondary market for syndicated loans but as the market developed, nonbanks are now the main participants).
160. See Richard W. Stewart, Collateralized Loan Obligations: A Primer, in The HANDBOOK OF Loan
Syndications and T rading 646, 646-47 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007) (describing a CLO as
“a special-purposes investment vehicle (SPV) established to accumulate a diversified pool of loans”).
161. See WIGHT ET AL., supra note 130 (outlining lender consent rights).
162. Id.
163. See Fox v. Dream Trust, 743 F. Supp. 2d 389, 398 (2010) (noting that distribution of a note to retail
investors weighs in favor of its treatment as a security).
164. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 68 (1990).
165. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1992).
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characterize them as anything other than investments. On the other hand, it is also clear
that, as institutional investors, loan purchasers should be well aware that loans are not
currently regulated as securities. This Reves factor’s framing thus suffers from a circularity
problem. Should the fact that investors are aware that leveraged loans are treated as non
securities imply that they can never be regulated as securities? That result seems
implausible.
The fourth Reves factor considers whether the debt instrument contains or is subject
to some risk-reducing factor. Riskier financial instruments are, generally speaking, more
likely to call for the protection of the securities laws, and thus risk-reducing features weigh
against treatment as a security under Reves. The Banco Espanol court relied on the OCC’s
oversight of national banks to find this fourth factor satisfied with respect to loan
participations. The court’s conclusion on this factor is puzzling, given that many o f the
purchasers of the loan participations were non-banks.166 Moreover, for purposes of the
fourth Reves factor, it is not sufficient simply to point to the existence of another regulatory
scheme; such regulation must in some way reduce the risk of the instrument for the
purchaser.167
The fact that most leveraged loans are secured by the assets of the borrowing company
is thus a more plausible risk-reducing factor than the OCC’s bank oversight.168 Yet secured
bonds, which are increasingly common, remain securities, notwithstanding the existence
of collateral protection. Conversely, many leveraged loans are unsecured or second-lien,
and thus far neither the courts nor the SEC have treated such instruments as securities.
Thus, each of the four Reves factors weighs in favor of treating syndicated loans as
securities. This is particularly so for leveraged loans. The Reves analysis suggests that
leveraged loans, which are widely traded, highly risky investments, fit very poorly within
the commercial loan framework that has until now justified their treatment as non
securities.169
More generally, the Reves analysis of leveraged loans uncovers a key flaw in the
family resemblance test: gauging whether a debt instrument is analogous to a particular
166. For a critique of the Banco Espanol court’s reliance on the OCC regulatory scheme, see Louisa C.
Crampton, Originating Lender Bank Liability to Participants in the B-Tranche o f a Leveraged Loan: Mending
the Gap Between Federal Banking and Federal Securities Regulation, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 255,283-86 (1997),
stating that while the Banco Espanol court considered the OCC’s Banking Circular 181 to be “an adequate
substitute for the federal securities laws” it did not further examine the guidelines “to ensure that they would
provide participants with protections against nondisclosure, fraud, or misrepresentation by the originating bank”;
Komegay, supra note 129, at 848 (arguing that the relevant OCC guidelines did not protect investors in loan
participations).
167. See Richard Y. Roberts & Randall W. Quinn, Leveling the Playing Field: The Need fo r Investor
Protection fo r Bank Sales o f Loan Participations, 63 F o r d h a m L. R ev . 2115, 2117 (1995) (asserting that
“purchasers of loan participations that function as investments should be protected by the federal securities laws”).
168. See Fox, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (citing Bass v. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc., 210 F.3d577, 585 (6th
Cir. 2000)) (explaining that the fourth Reves factor “calls for examination o f other risk-reducing factors, such as
collateralization”).
169. As discussed, that loans are regulated differently from securities stems from their history as bilateral,
illiquid commercial arrangements. In this regard, the odd regulatory status quo of syndicated loans is similar to
that o f derivatives, which historically were not regulated as securities simply due to their origins in the
commodities realm. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics o f Derivative Securities Regulation 14 Y a l e
J. o n R e g . 279(1997).
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family of instruments deemed non-securities becomes a meaningless exercise when the
underlying archetypes for each family are themselves rapidly changing. Indeed, the Banco
Espanol court sought to determine whether the loan participations at issue were analogous
to commercial loans, yet failed to acknowledge that the paradigm of commercial lending
was itself in flux.170

4. Regulatory Stickiness
If leveraged loans and high-yield bonds are now virtually interchangeable, and if a
correct application of the case law would conclude that leveraged loans are securities,
where are the calls to treat them accordingly? Treating like cases alike is a fundamental
principle of the legal system in a liberal democracy,171 regardless of whether it is achieved
or even achievable in practice. More mundanely, the persistence of the regulatory
distinction between leveraged loans and high-yield bonds now borders on the absurd. Why
then are the major regulatory and market players silent on this issue?
One likely explanation is that the SEC has bigger fish to fry. After the Second Circuit
dealt it a loss in Banco Espanol, the SEC apparently decided to take a wait-and-see
approach with respect to syndicated loans. And in the meantime, the securities markets
were rocked by successive large-scale scandals such as Enron, the executive compensation
and earnings management accounting scandals of the early 2000s, the dot-com bubble
bursting, the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and the mortgage-backed securities and credit default
swap implosions. By contrast, the leveraged loan market has hummed along relatively
smoothly.172 Though issuance volume and trading surged over the last decade—an
obvious trigger for regulatory attention—the leveraged loan market has yet to experience
the major upheavals or scandals that would force the SEC’s hand by drawing the public’s
attention. The leveraged loan market is at once the most dynamic and the least visible
capital market in the U.S., which is exactly how its participants like it.
Of course, the financial crisis hardly left the syndicated loan market unscathed. The
largest U.S. banks had committed to funding billions in leveraged loans just before the
credit crisis began, and were unable to offload the commitments, triggering massive and
immediate losses on their balance sheets.173 Yet the credit crunch in the leveraged loan
market failed to trigger the public ire for two reasons.
First, the significantly larger losses from mortgage-backed securities and credit
default swaps made these better targets for a Wall Street backlash than syndicated lending.
Second, unlike the subprime mortgage blowup, which affected seemingly everyone from
the largest financial institutions down to the American consumer, the leveraged loan crisis
was relatively well contained to the financial players involved in purchasing leveraged

170. For a different critique of Reves in this context, see Crampton, supra note 166, at 271 n.122 and
accompanying text, explaining that the Reves court “acknowledged this lack of predictability”.
171. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 227 (1977) (identifying the right to equal
treatment, which is defined as “the right to an equal distribution of some opportunity or resource or burden”).
172. See Amar Gande & Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for
Loans?, 67 J. FIN. 1649, 1650 (2012) (noting that the trading volume for syndicated loans declined only slightly
during the recent financial crisis, as compared to the crashes in structured finance).
173. Wilmarth, supra note 79, at 971.
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loans. When the crisis hit, commentators immediately predicted a rash of bankruptcies by
over-leveraged companies, particularly private equity-owned ones, which, it was said, had
pushed the envelope of easy credit too far. But as of 2014 we are still waiting for the other
shoe to drop. While below-investment grade issuers did experience increased defaults post
crisis, the effects did not nearly trickle down to corporate America and consumers to the
extent predicted.174
Moreover, to the extent that observers were concerned by over-lending in the
leveraged loan market, the blame was placed on the folly of investors, rather than on
issuers’ fraudulent behavior. There were no real allegations that leveraged issuers had
misstated their financials or otherwise misled creditors or provided insufficient disclosure;
high-yield investors simply made a bad bet. Imposing new disclosure requirements on
issuers of leveraged loans would thus have been an odd solution.175 Finally, and perhaps
most significantly for purposes of this Article, to the extent that the leveraged loan market
suffered harm, the high-yield bond market suffered even more.176 It would be difficult to
point to securities regulation as the solution to problems in the leveraged loan market when
an equivalent regulated market experienced the very same problems.
A second possibility is that the SEC is incentivized to remain hands-off with respect
to private markets (such as the corporate loan markets), even as they expand and thrive,
while tightly regulating the already-existing public markets.177 Zachary Gubler argues that
the SEC has strong incentives not to regulate private capital markets, notwithstanding their
dramatic expansion and relatively anemic activity in the public markets (particularly the
market for IPOs).178 This is so, he argues, because the SEC employees’ private incentives
are not best served by forever expanding the SEC’s regulatory reach. Rather, the SEC
employees may be better off allowing vast, unregulated private markets to develop, in order

174. First, the defaults were very frequently resolved as voluntary workouts among creditors (particularly
when the borrower was private-equity-owned), avoiding the upheavals of bankruptcy and the finality of
liquidation. See Ernst & Young, Private Equity Buys Time with Major Refinancings, Knowledge@Wharton
at 4 (Apr. 24, 2012), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/emst-young-private-equity-buys-time-withmajor-refinancings/. Second, many leveraged issuers took advantage of a temporary credit easing in the highyield bond market in late 2010 to refinance their leveraged loans as high-yield bonds (pointing once again to the
fluidity between, and interchangeable nature of, the two markets) and extend the maturities on their debt. Id. As
a result, the American public did not experience the trauma of a major wave of corporate bankruptcies resulting
from pressure in the leveraged loan market.
175. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge o f Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev . 301, 329 (2004) (noting that during periods of irrational investor behavior such as
market bubbles, investors tend to ignore or discount correct information that would dampen their exuberance). In
recent years, the key regulatory concern in the corporate loan and bond markets has not been issuers abusing
investors, but systemic effects from overly permissive lending by depositary banks or other large financial
institutions. I suspect that there is broad agreement that this problem is best addressed by regulating lending
institutions themselves (for example, through strict minimum capital requirements for banks), rather than through
new regulation of all assets in which lending institutions might possibly invest.
176. See Sansone et al., supra note 15, at 4 (noting a higher default rate for high-yield bonds than for
leveraged loans on average).
177. See generally Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market 91 N C L
Rev . 745 (2013).
178. See id. (discussing the smaller number of interest groups affected in the private markets compared to
public markets).
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to keep special interest groups happy and maximize their future job opportunities.
Simultaneously, to reassure the general public that they are acting diligently, they will
impose tight regulation in the markets that are already public. If correct, Gubler’s
hypothesis would explain the observed pattern of regulatory laissez-faire with respect to
leveraged loans.
A final intriguing explanation for the continued discrepancy in the regulation of loans
and bonds is the one proffered in Part V of this Article, namely that the relevant actors all
recognize that, in practice, applying securities regulation simply would not make much of
a difference. At base, the current situation is one in which the regulatory treatment is
determined simply by whether the borrower and investors choose to refer to the instrument
as a “loan” or a “bond.” In effect, loan market participants are making the fact of non
regulation a self-fulfilling prophecy by deliberately keeping their eyes shut to the absurdity
of this dichotomy . 179 They are gambling that the courts and regulators will not upset
current practice with trillions of dollars at stake. 180
Putting aside the regulatory inertia, in an ideal world, what ought to be done about the
specious distinction between leveraged loans and high-yield bonds? An obvious solution
is to begin regulating leveraged loans as securities, and subject them to the same mandatory
disclosure and other securities rules as high-yield bonds. This, I have argued, would be the
doctrinally correct answer. Yet, the next Part demonstrates that mandatory disclosure is
ineffective in the high-yield bond market, making it inadvisable as a policy choice.
V . T h e D e b t -M a r k e t N a t u r a l E x p e r i m e n t

A. Natural Experiment
Part II of this Article detailed the difficulties involved in testing whether mandatory
disclosure is effective. While we are unlikely ever to answer the question of whether
securities regulation is effective generally—for all times and all market actors—we may
still draw lessons from developments in the financial markets and continued testing. One
option is to watch opportunistically for special market conditions that approach the
randomized trial ideal. The convergence of the leveraged loan market and the high-yield
bond market presents precisely such a situation: for the first time, we have a pair of virtually
identical debt markets—with the same issuers, investors, pricing, and terms— and only one
of which is regulated as a securities market.
Much can be salvaged from this natural experiment, notwithstanding the obstacles to
a true empirical test. The trick is to return to the goals of mandatory disclosure in securities
regulation. If we take the SEC at its word that it acts in the public interest, and thereby rule
out special-interest goals, we find that the various public-interest goals of mandatory

179. The definitive reference on the development and mechanics of syndicated loans begins with the
following admonition: “LOANS ARE NOT SECURITIES!” Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone, Preface to The
Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading xv, xvi (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007). The
emphasis strongly suggests that this statement is not merely descriptive, but precatory.
180. Cf. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 385 (describing generally how market participants
rapidly exploit regulatory voids, notwithstanding the legal risks, because doing so gives them significantly greater
political and estoppel grounds to resist an unfavorable regulatory change).
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disclosure noted in Part II.B fall into two broad categories: (1) protecting unsophisticated
investors, and (2) correcting inefficiencies in the production, dissemination, and
verification of investment information.181
To clarify the second goal, securities-law scholars generally agree that in the absence
of mandatory disclosure, it is at least conceivable that the amount of credible, material
information available to investors would be suboptimal.182 Why might financial markets,
left to their own devices, generate too little credible information or distribute it
inefficiently? Although material information about issuers is clearly valuable to investors,
they may not be willing to pay for such information to be produced and verified: due to the
difficulties of coordinating as a group and the ability to ffee-ride on others’ efforts, they
will underinvest in information.183 Conversely, by duplicating some of each other’s efforts
in the absence of public disclosure, investors and analysts may simultaneously overinvest
in information.184 Imposing disclosure requirements on issuers could mitigate these
inefficiencies in the market for investment information. Through detailed requirements as
to the content, timing, and format of corporate disclosures, backed up by robust antifraud
liability, mandatory disclosure could correct both the underproduction of accurate
investment information and the overproduction of false or misleading investment
information that would occur in an unregulated market.185
This hypothesis has testable implications. If investors are rational, they will reward
markets subject to mandatory disclosure with more investment.186 So long as it is not
excessively costly, the imposition o f mandatory disclosure should result in an increase in
a given market’s amount o f investment. By effectively subsidizing the production and
dissemination of reliable information, and punishing the production of false or misleading
information, mandatory disclosure should push the amount of investment closer to the
optimal equilibrium.

181. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Historical Needfo r a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. Corp.
L. 1, 9 (1983) (discussing five principal arguments to justify the SEC’s mandatory corporate disclosure system);
Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 372.
182. Explanations for why issuers might produce less information than is socially optimal center on free
riding and collective action problems among investors and analysts, as well as the third-party externalities
associated with disclosure. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 23, at 731-34 (arguing that mandatory investment can
prevent over and under-investment in securities research by analysts); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at
686 (acknowledging that firms might under-disclose in the absence of regulation because disclosure by one firm
benefits investors in other firms, as well as non-shareholder constituencies); Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role o f Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 755-66 (2006) (arguing in favor
of mandatory disclosure as reducing information traders’ search costs, and therefore increasing market
efficiency). The basis for all of these arguments is the notion that information is a public good. Fox, supra note
29, at 1393—95; Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for
Publicly Traded Corporations: "Are We There Yet? "20 Cardozo L. Rev . 135, 198-201 (1998).
183. See supra note 182 (detailing the various explanations for why investors might underinvest in
information).
184. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 731-34 (arguing that mandatory investment can prevent both over and
under-investment in securities research by analysts).
185. See generally supra note 10 (discussing that one the goals of mandatory disclosure is to remedy the
underproduction of material investment information).
186. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 673 (“A world with fraud, or without adequate truthful
information, is a world with too little investment. . . . ”).
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In testing this hypothesis, we face the problem that the first goal of mandatory
disclosure, protecting unsophisticated investors, may have precisely the opposite effect on
investment. For example, regulatory efforts to prevent unsophisticated investors from
taking on too much risk might take the form of actively discouraging or even prohibiting
them from investing, resulting in less investment overall in that particular market. Yet, in
the corporate debt markets our task is immensely simplified, as direct retail investors are
effectively absent from both the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets . 187 The first
goal of mandatory disclosure can be safely ignored, clearing away much of the complexity
on both the benefit and cost sides of the regulatory equation. With retail investors out of
the picture, we are left with only the second goal: remedying inefficiencies that suppress
the production of accurate investment information by issuers. This allows us to employ the
level of investment in a given market as a rough proxy for the effectiveness of securities
regulation: mandatory disclosure should drive up investment in that market; its absence
should spur a decline in investment.
Assume for the time being that the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets are
perfectly identical as a functional matter, save for their regulation . 188 If mandatory
disclosure were truly achieving its goal in the high-yield bond market, then investors (and
therefore issuers) should prefer it to the leveraged loan market. Stated differently, if
mandatory disclosure is indeed effective at solving investors’ free-riding and collective
action problems, it should be in the joint best interests of investors and issuers to subject
firms to it. Investors and issuers should flock to the regulated market and shun the
unregulated market, such that we would observe all of the volume and liquidity in the highyield bond market.
Yet, instead the leveraged loan market has flourished and now exhibits greater volume
and liquidity than its regulated counterpart. 189 Under the orthodoxy of mandatory
disclosure, a liquid leveraged loan market ought not to exist. This fact alone therefore poses
a significant problem for the current regulatory regime: it is not achieving its only plausible
goal.
B. How We Got Here and What to Do About It
Unfortunately, our work is not yet done. The conclusion that mandatory disclosure is
ineffective does not on its own reveal the right policy response because we are left with a
puzzle: how is it that the leveraged loan and high-yield bond markets continue to exist sideby-side? Under our simple thought experiment above, if mandatory disclosure were
effective, there would be no leveraged loan market. Yet, if mandatory disclosure is indeed
ineffective, as I have argued, there should be no high-yield bond market.
We therefore have a puzzle in two parts. First, just why is it that mandatory disclosure
might be proving ineffective? How can we explain the dizzying growth of the leveraged
loan market in the absence of securities regulation? Why would investors ever favor an
equivalent market to high-yield bonds providing less disclosure? Second, if mandatory
disclosure is indeed ineffective, how can we explain the continued existence of the high-

187. See Evans, supra note 88, at 1105 (stating that retail investors owned less than 30% of U.S.
corporations’ stock in 2009).
188. This assumption will be relaxed in Part V.B.2 infra.
189. See supra note 13 (stating that the leveraged loan market reached $664 million in issuances in 2012).
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yield bond market? Why wouldn’t issuers and investors avoid the costs of ineffective
regulation in the high-yield market and deal exclusively in leveraged loans? Only by
answering these questions can we determine the appropriate regulatory course of action.
1. Why the Leveraged Loan Market?
If mandatory disclosure is indeed ineffective in the debt markets, and leveraged loans
have thrived accordingly, there would seem to be two plausible explanations. One
possibility is that the information failures that may originally have justified its imposition
no longer exist or have been sufficiently mitigated through non-regulatory mechanisms.
Indeed, how could there be a liquid leveraged loan market in the absence of mandated
disclosure? What has prompted non-bank investors to purchase loans so willingly, despite
declining covenant protection and monitoring? Why were loans entirely illiquid just over
30 years ago—precisely due to the difficulty of transferring information about the issuer to
another creditor—when today they are heavily traded?
It must be that loan investors are relying on new sources of information or
mechanisms for disseminating it, obtained solely through private ordering. As discussed in
Part IV.A, deregulation of the banking industry and capital requirements favoring
diversification prompted strong demand for tradable loans. And once the demand was
there, institutional structures quickly arose to satisfy it, including by getting material
information out to investors. The Loan Syndications and Trading Association, a private
trade association for lenders, was created and prompted a slew of changes making possible
the widespread syndication and secondary trading of loans.190 These included drafting
standardized loan assignment forms (similar in function to the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association forms for derivatives) and credit agreement provisions, facilitating
mark-to-market pricing, and creating a pricing index for loans. All of these either conveyed
previously unavailable information about loan issuers to investors or facilitated the rapid
dissemination of existing information.191
As the market developed, the credit rating agencies began rating syndicated loans,192
Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIPs) were added to credit
facilities, the financial press began covering leveraged loans, and specialized databases
began compiling loan pricing and terms that were formerly entirely private.193 It turns out
that dispersed lenders can obtain valuable information about borrowers and credit facilities
from a wide range of sources, even when the borrower is a private company.194 While the

190. See Allison A. Taylor, The LSTA and its Role in the Promotion o f the Corporate Loan Asset Class, in
The Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading 61,61-75 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007)
(discussing the Loan Syndications and Trading Association’s history, an overview of its significant
accomplishments, and analysis of its impact on the development of that asset class during the 1990s and 2000s).
191. Even in imperfectly efficient markets, prices incorporate all manner of investment-relevant information.
See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 667—70 (describing how the pricing of private debt may convey private
information held by banks to other investors).
192. Standard & Poor’s, A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 11.
193. The continued standardization of U.S. accounting principles has also undoubtedly favored lenders, as
lenders can delegate monitoring to audit firms by requiring borrowers to have their financials audited.
194. The success of the loan market is particularly surprising in light of the fact that there is no true exchange
or other single private institution that oversees or directs disclosure and other practices in the markets. The Loan
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credit rating agencies’ failures are legion, 195 the rating agencies clearly perform better
when rating traditional corporate debt instruments (such as loans and bonds) than complex
mortgage-backed securities and the related structured asset products for which they were
notorious during the financial crisis. 196 Through their (albeit imperfect) gatekeeping
function, the credit rating agencies convey to the wider loan investor community
substantial private information obtained during their ratings process.
Finally, it may be that the lead arranger197 of a leveraged loan financing acts as a
“reputational intermediary” 198 between issuers and loan investors. When a lead arranger
retains some portion of a loan on its books, rather than syndicating the entire loan, it
certifies to some degree the issuer’s creditworthiness to the rest of the syndicate. 199 If so,
the lead arranger mitigates to some degree the relative dearth of publicly available
information. Through any or all of these mechanisms, private ordering in the leveraged
loan market appears to be substituting for the types of information that the securities laws
require issuers to disclose publicly.
A different possibility for why mandatory disclosure is proving ineffective and the
leveraged loan market has prospered is that, while information production may indeed be
suboptimal in unregulated debt markets, mandatory disclosure is a poor solution to the
problem. Because we have no ready means of determining what optimal disclosure might
Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), the trade association for loan market participants, performs many
useful coordinating functions in the loan market, but does not impose mandatory terms or disclosure. See Taylor,
supra note 190, at 61 (describing the LSTA as “promoting] cooperation and coordination between the firms
transacting in loans” through a “consensus-building process”). This is in contrast to the public securities markets,
in which private institutions such as the securities exchanges exercise a quasi-regulatory function. See Paul G.
Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 Va . L. Rev . 1453, 1457-58 (1997) (describing incentives for private
institutions to regulate the securities market). Many vocal critics of regulatory overreach in the securities markets
argue that the exchanges already provide adequate oversight: in other words, we need not fear deregulation if
there is an alternative institution that can coordinate and direct the market. Id. at 1459.
195. See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit Crisis": The Limits o f
Reputation, the Insufficiency o f Reform, and a Proposal fo r Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. Rev . 109, 113
(2009) (noting the inherent conflicts of interest involved in the ratings process, given that the rating agencies are
paid by the issuers being rated); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert o f Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down
fo r the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 619, 648^49 (1999) (noting the lack of competition among
rating agencies); Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in
Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? 59, 64 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds.,
2006) (arguing that rating agencies are encouraged even by investors to provide overly optimistic ratings).
196. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 115,
177-78 (2013) (explaining why the credit rating agencies performed especially poorly in rating structured asset
products during the financial crisis).
197. See Taylor & Yang, supra note 80 and accompanying text (explaining the function of lead arrangers of
syndicated loans).
198. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 29, at 618.
199. See generally Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from
Syndicated Loans, 62 J. FIN. 629 (2007) (finding that lead arrangers retain larger shares of loans on their books
through the syndication process when the borrowing company requires more intense screening and monitoring).
To date, the evidence on whether lead arrangers themselves perform a gatekeeping role is mixed, as there is some
evidence that bank monitoring declines with loan syndication and secondary trading, but that investors are willing
to buy simply because of the benefits of diversification. Gande & Saunders, supra note 172, at 1675-77. For an
overview of the literature summarizing the competing views on whether lead arrangers perform a risk-reduction
function in the syndicated loan markets, see Altunbas et al., supra note 78, at 75-78 (2006).

762

The Journal o f Corporation Law

[Vol. 39:4

be, the current mandated disclosure may simply be excessive or cover the wrong
information.200 Similarly, while the SEC is sophisticated and relatively well-staffed, the
regulatory process is undeniably slow.201 To the extent that the optimal type and amount
of disclosure changes over time, the securities regulations may be slow to respond, at least
relative to practices in the private markets. By effectively prohibiting innovation in
disclosure, the regulated markets may be straying ever further from optimal disclosure than
the unregulated markets.
A final explanation for the leveraged loan phenomenon should be mentioned—and
dismissed. The natural experiment described in Part A is imperfect because the issuers may
choose whether to issue loans or bonds, and therefore whether to subject themselves to
securities regulation.202 This introduces the possibility of selection bias, which departs
from the drug-trial ideal of randomization. To the extent one observes different outcomes
in these markets, these may be due to unobserved ex ante differences in their respective
issuers, for example, rather than purely due to the application vel non of securities
regulation. Given that issuers view the two forms of debt as substitutes203 and that many
issuers have both leveraged loans and high-yield bonds in their capital structure at the same
time,204 there are unlikely to be significant ex ante differences between issuers in the two
groups. But these cannot be ruled out with theory alone. What we can rule out is the
possibility that the leveraged loan market is simply the market for “lemons,”205 to which
low-quality issuers run to escape the securities registration process. The relative credit risks
of the leveraged loan and high-yield bonds markets belie any such adverse selection effect:
while leveraged loans and high-yield bonds have similar historic default rates (4% and
4.3%, respectively), the average creditor recovery following a default is significantly
higher for leveraged loans (66%) than for high-yield bonds (41%).206

200. In addition to imposing direct, out-of-pocket costs on issuers (and therefore investors), excessive
disclosure also imposes indirect costs on investors. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing the
cost of mandatory disclosure). For example, if issuers disclose everything under the sun, investors could be more
inclined to lose the forest for the trees, to become inured to disclosure (c.f., the ubiquitous “Risk Factors”), or
worse, it might enable issuers to and hide bad information in a sea of innocuous information (the proverbial needle
in a haystack).
201. See Mulherin, supra note 27, at 424 (discussing the difficulties posed by the lengthy regulatory process
for empirical tests of regulation).
202. See, e.g., J oshua R osenbaum & J oshua P earl , Investment Banking : V aluation , Leveraged
Buyouts , and M ergers and Acquisitions 178 (2009) (noting that targets o f leveraged buyouts may be funded
by bank loans, high-yield bonds, or some combination of the foregoing, among other types o f debt).
203. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing syndicated loans and bonds as substitutes).
204. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect o f Sarbanes-Oxley
on F irm s' Going-private Decisions, 76 U. Ch i . L. R ev . 7, 22-23 (2009) (discussing the issuance of leveraged
loans and high-yield bonds).
205. George A. Akerlof, The Market fo r "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. Econ . 488,495 (1970).
206. The Loan Syndications & Trading Ass ’n , Through the Cycle: Senior Secured Loans Poised
TO Perform, supra note 57, at 9. See also Sansone et al., supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the
peak of leveraged loans and high-yield bonds).
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2. Why the High-Yield Bond Market?
If this Article’s thesis regarding the ineffectiveness of mandatory disclosure is correct,
the continued existence of the high-yield bond market demands explanation. Why would
companies still choose to issue in the public high-yield bond market, given the added
regulatory transaction costs? Here the possibilities are three-fold.
First, it may be that for some subset of particularly risky or opaque firms, the choice
of the high-yield market (and thus of mandatory disclosure) may serve as a credible signal
of quality, without which such firms would not be able to attract investors. If so, then
mandatory disclosure is doing some work for a small segment of the overall market, and
this Article’s conclusion about the failings of mandatory disclosure should be scaled back
accordingly.
The second possibility, for which there is considerably more support, is that many of
the largest institutional investors in the U.S. financial markets such as pension funds,
mutual funds, and insurance companies are required to hold all or some minimum portion
of their assets in the form of registered securities. These requirements may take the form
of either regulatory fiat207 or internal policies adopted for prudential reasons. Both reflect
the long-standing (though increasingly contestable) notion that, all else being equal,
registered securities are safer than unregistered ones. Such investors cannot hold a portfolio
comprised exclusively of leveraged loans. Thus, to reach such investors, some subset of all
borrowing companies will issue publicly registered high-yield bonds, rather than loans.
A third possible raison d ’etre for the high-yield bond market stems from the fact that,
notwithstanding our prior assumption, the convergence of the leveraged loan and highyield bond markets is as yet incomplete. While the two instruments can be rendered
functionally identical in any given instance through drafting, in practice we still find certain
differences between them on average, though these are rapidly diminishing.208 Most
significantly, it is still the case that leveraged loans tend to be secured by the borrowing
company’s assets, which reduces credit risk, while high-yield bonds tend to be
unsecured.209
This dichotomy points the way to what ought to be the ongoing natural experiment in
this area. We begin by categorizing leveraged loans and high-yield bonds according to
whether they are secured by the borrower’s assets. Table 3 below provides the current state
of each such market segment.

207. See, e.g., V anguard G roup , Inc ., Part B Vanguard F ixed Income Securities Funds Statement
A dditional Information B-26 (2013), available at https://personaI.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/sai028.pdf
(describing the SEC regulations limiting mutual funds’ holdings of illiquid and restricted securities, which include
unregistered securities).
208. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the remaining differences between leveraged loans and high-yield
bonds).
209. See ROSENBAUM & PEARL, supra note 202, at 184-85 (describing high-yield bonds as “typically
unsecured”).

of

764

The Journal o f Corporation Law

[Vol. 39:4

Table 3. High-Yield Fixed Income—Current State

Secured
Unsecured

Leveraged Loans

High-Yield Bonds

Large volume
Small, but increasing volume;
recent surge in second-lien loans

Small, but increasing volume
Large volume

The focus o f the experiment should be on two market segments: (1) unsecured
leveraged loans, and (2) secured bonds. It would strongly signal that mandatory disclosure
is proving unnecessary for investors in the corporate debt markets if unsecured leveraged
loans continued to expand and eventually rivaled the size of the unsecured bond market.
For this reason, regulators should keep an especially close eye on the volume of secondlien loans, which are tantalizingly close to unsecured debt.210 If the second-lien market
continues its rapid expansion, it would suggest a surprising shift in loan investors’
expectations—away from negotiated credit protection (covenants, monitoring, and
collateral)211 and toward alternative sources of risk reduction,212 all in the absence of
mandatory disclosure. On the other hand, if the secured bond market continues to expand,
notwithstanding the ready alternative of secured loans, we would have to acknowledge
that, whether it is effective or not, securities regulation in the fixed-income markets is not
proving particularly burdensome.
C. Implications
Whether the explanation is that information is now cheaply and reliably produced in
the debt markets without regulatory intervention, or that mandatory disclosure only makes
information problems worse, the conclusion that mandatory disclosure case is ineffective
is a troubling one. There would seem to be a strong case not only for continuing to rely
solely on private ordering in the loan markets, but also for jettisoning mandatory disclosure
in the bond markets. Yet, I remain agnostic about whether scaling back the securities
regulation of bonds is the appropriate response. In fact, there are several plausible
justifications for maintaining the regulatory status quo, notwithstanding the doctrinal
inconsistency.
First, maintaining the two markets side-by-side may yield invaluable information as
to what optimal disclosure actually looks like. To the extent that disclosure in the leveraged
loan market continues to diverge from that in the high-yield bond market, even while the
leveraged loan market continues to thrive, mandated disclosure may well be too ossified to
be useful for investors.213 If disclosure in the two markets begins to converge, however,

210. Standard & Poor’s A Guide to the Loan Market, supra note 62, at 17-18 (describing secondlien loans and noting their higher yields and looser covenants as compared to first-lien debt).
211. See Whitehead, supra note 58, at 643—44 (finding that monitoring and covenants may no longer be the
most cost-efficient means of managing credit risk).
212. See supra Part V.B.l (providing explanations for the leveraged loan phenomenon).
213. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 14, at 365 (recognizing that it is an open question whether the
SEC is imposing the optimal level of disclosure).
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we can be more confident that the SEC is adequately anticipating investors’ needs. This
would provide useful guidance for other markets subject to mandatory disclosure such as
the public stock markets. Second, certain institutional investors are still confined to holding
registered securities, such as public bonds.214 Eliminating mandatory disclosure in the
high-yield bond market would preclude such investors from participating in the market
going forward.
Note that as we approach true interchangeability of loans and bonds, we also approach
a regime in which securities regulation is truly elective. Such a regime has heretofore only
been envisioned, and sometimes advocated, by scholars.215 While private markets of
tradable non-securities have existed for some time (think of over-the-counter derivatives
contracts), we have never before had a situation in which a non-securities market was
essentially identical to a public securities market in pricing, terms, investors, and liquidity.
Allowing this natural experiment to persist should yield crucial insights not only into the
debt markets, but also into securities regulation in general.
D. Final Caveats
The conclusion that mandatory disclosure is ineffective in the debt markets, though
significant, should be appropriately cabined. In particular, it is unclear whether it can be
extended to the equity markets. Many of the differences between debt and equity, and in
particular between debt investors and equity investors, bear on the wisdom of mandatory
disclosure.
First, and most importantly, the private ordering that exists in the debt markets to
generate information and reduce risk may not be feasible in the equity markets. The pillars
of mandatory disclosure—the disclosure of financial information and anti-fraud liability—
are voluntarily adopted in loan agreements. Through routine covenants, borrowers agree to
produce periodic financial statements throughout the life of the loan, and have them audited
and distributed to creditors.216 Similarly, borrowers make a standard representation in loan
agreements that specifically tracks the language of Rule 1Ob-5.217 Thus, by means of
contract, loan investors negotiate for similar protections to what the securities laws
mandate.
Why are such private ordering solutions infeasible for stockholders? The key
difference is that corporate debt is outstanding for a limited and predetermined period of
time, most often less than ten years. The relevant parties can agree relatively easily on what
would be useful for investors to know and what would be feasible for the company to
provide while the loan is outstanding. Equity, on the other hand, is of potentially infinite
214. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s regulations limiting mutual funds’
holdings).
215. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 29, at 2361-62 (advocating a reconceptualization of securities regulation
to a market approach, “by modifying the federal law in favor or a menu approach to securities regulation under
which firms elect whether to be covered by federal laws or by the securities law of a specified state”); Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach o f Securities Regulation,
71 S. Cal. L. Rev . 903, 904-06 (1998) (recommending a “regulatory regime that focuses on regulatory
competition and gives issuers and investors the ability to choose the law that governs their transactions”).
216. WIGHT ET al ., supra note 130.
217. Id. at 273.
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duration. The transaction costs would be too high for the company and its stockholders to
agree ex ante on what the company would provide as disclosure forever, and amendments
would be too costly.218
A second difference may be linked to the stage in the corporate lifecycle at which
mandatory disclosure comes into play. Equity funding of some kind is clearly required
from the outset, while debt financing is usually only available when the firm has reached a
certain level of maturity and stability in its cash flows. The fact that debt is most typically
issued by mature companies lessens both the riskiness of the investment and the difficulty
of specifying appropriate disclosure.219
Third, although their participation is declining as a percentage of the whole, direct
retail investors still hold a meaningful share of the public equity markets.220 As discussed,
the protection of investors that have little ability to bear losses is a fundamentally different,
and sometimes conflicting, goal from correcting the market’s informational
inefficiencies.221 The foregoing analysis of mandatory disclosure only holds to the extent
that we put aside the goal of protecting unsophisticated investors, which we can
comfortably do in the corporate debt markets.222
E. The 144A Red Herring
As a result of the 1990 promulgation of Rule 144A, the regulatory divide between
loans and bonds is in fact more nuanced than it has been depicted here thus far.223 Rule
218. See generally O liver H art , Firms , C ontracts , and Financial Structure (1995) (using the theory
of incomplete contracts to justify firms’ capital structure); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete
Contracts and the Theory o f Contract Design, 56 C ase W. Res . L. Rev . 187 (2005). This is partly why corporate
charters and by-laws are so spare in their provisions—they are intended to govern indefinitely. Another way of
saying this: we can say with something like a straight face that debt issuances involve a negotiated contractual
relationship between issuers and investors, whereas the notion becomes more dubious for equity, the terms of
which generally amount to a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.
219. Cf. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 Geo . WASH. L. REV. 764, 787 (2012). With
equity investments, the nightmare (and not implausible) scenario for regulators is that shareholders will lose their
entire investment. With debt, that concern is significantly lessened—debt instruments (at least, straight debt
instruments) are simply less risky on average, because they are higher in priority in the capital structure than
equity.
220. As but one example, the SEC’s exemption for private placements under Rule 506 and congressional
preemption of state regulation have arguably opened the door to significant abuses in small placements, involving
the marketing of highly risky and sometimes fraudulent securities to unwary individuals with little ability to bear
losses. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 D el . J. C orp . L. 151, 188
(2010) (stating that exemption makes retail investors vulnerable).
221. For this reason, if we opted to scale back securities regulation of the bond markets, the void may need
to be filled by restrictions on individuals’ direct participation in the market. In other words, this might push us
into a system of regulating investors rather than issuers. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A
Market-Based Proposal, 88 C al . L. R ev . 280, 283 (2000) (advocating for a regime in which the nature of the
investor determines securities regulation).
222. If this Article’s conclusion does not necessarily extend to equity, the same is true as to other, more
exotic types o f debt and more complex financial instruments such as derivatives, which have less well-established
markets and market participants, and raise a host o f different concerns, including a greater likelihood o f systemic
effects if the market sours. With derivatives in particular, losses can be amplified far beyond the “mere” loss of
one’s investment, making systemic effects more likely than for traditional corporate debt.
223. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2013).
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144A exempts from securities registration any resales of securities made exclusively to
qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), that is, to financial institutions that own and manage
more than $100 million in investments.224 Sales of corporate bonds under Rule 144A have
been wildly popular, including in particular in the high-yield space. A typical high-yield
bond offering of this type begins with the sale of the bonds from the issuer to the
underwriters (referred to in this context as “initial purchasers”).225 Rule 144A then
exempts from registration under the ‘33 Act the resale of the notes from the underwriters
to the ultimate investors, and all subsequent trading among investors, so long as they are
QIBs. Thus, unregistered Rule 144A notes occupy a place on the spectrum between
traditional, private bank loans and public, registered bonds. Furthermore, like syndicated
loans, they blur the distinction between private and public debt.
Because Rule 144A high-yield offerings are not subject to mandatory disclosure under
the securities laws, at first blush they appear to be an obvious starting point for testing the
effects of mandatory disclosure in the debt markets: the natural experiment would simply
involve comparing registered (public) high-yield bonds to unregistered (Rule 144A) highyield bonds, rather than to leveraged loans. And in fact, the disclosure provided in offering
memoranda for Rule 144A offerings is virtually identical to that in registration statements
for public bonds, notwithstanding the absence of disclosure requirements.226 Does this
imply that mandated disclosure in the public market is in fact the optimal level of
disclosure?227 If private offerings voluntarily mimic disclosure in the public markets,
shouldn’t that suggest that the public markets require the “right” level of disclosure?
Unfortunately, the disclosure practices in the Rule 144A market are a false lead.
Voluntary disclosure under Rule 144A mimics disclosure for registered offerings because
Rule 144A merely serves as a waiting room228 for public registration. Bonds that are
initially sold under Rule 144A are most often subsequently exchanged into registered
public bonds.229 The offering memorandum for a Rule 144A offering anticipates that event
and its disclosure is prepared accordingly.230 Why the two-step registration process? Rule
144A allows issuers to close deals quickly and avoid the delay associated with registered
224. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(l)(i) (2013).
225. M ark B. T resnowski & Gerald T. N owak , The H igh Y ield O ffering : An Issuer ’s Perspective
49 (2004), available at http://www.kirkland.com/files/Nowak_HighYieldOfferingsBook.PDF. The sale of
securities to the underwriters is exempt from registration as a private placement under Section 4(2) of the ’33 Act.
Id.
226. Id. at 25 (describing the offering memorandum for a Rule 144A offering as looking “very much like
the prospectus for a registered public offering”).
227. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 204, at 20 (2009) (describing the Sarbanes-Oxley’s effect on firms’ goingprivate decisions).
228. Credit is due to Don Langevoort for suggesting this analogy.
229. See William J. Whelan III, The Statutory Arrangement fo r Public and Private Securities Offerings
under the Securities Act o f 1933, in Securities O fferings 2007: Operating Under the N ew Rules 49,59
(Practicing Law Institute 2007) (discussing how “many offerings under Rule 144A are convertible debt” where
“the issuer typically agrees to file a so-called resale shelf-registration statement in order to provide investors with
freely tradable securities”); TRESNOWSKI & N owak , supra note 225, at 25 (describing the offering
memorandum’s resemblance to a registration statement for a public offering); ROSENBAUM & Pearl , supra note
202, at 185 (stating that, typically, high-yield bonds are initially sold to QIBs under Rule 144A, and then registered
with the SEC within one year).
230. Tresnowski & N owak , supra note 225, at 51.
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offerings,231 while the eventual registration eliminates the Rule 144A resale restrictions
and brings in investors who are restricted to holding registered securities.232 Thus, while
the dramatic growth of the 144A market is fascinating in its own right, its disclosure
practices unfortunately do not help us understand whether the disclosure mandated for
public bond offerings is optimal.
VI. C o n c l u s io n
The answer to whether mandatory disclosure, the lynchpin of federal securities
regulation, is effective has long remained elusive. Thanks to a novel natural experiment,
however, we may finally have that answer for the largest source of corporate financing, the
corporate debt markets. If leveraged loans, which continue to be treated as non-securities,
can surpass high-yield bonds in depth and liquidity, mandatory disclosure is not the optimal
mechanism for investment information that it purports to be. Solely through private
ordering, the loan market is now generating sufficient information to entice more robust
investment and trading than its regulated counterpart. What this means for securities
regulation is less clear. Though the continued regulatory discrepancy between loans and
bonds has become untenable as a doctrinal matter, the absence of pressure to correct from
either market participants or regulators suggests that, contrary to all expectations, little may
turn on the balance.

231. Id. at 5.
232. See Standard & Poor’s, High Yield Bond Primer, supra note 112 (noting that only a small (albeit
growing) percentage of 144A high-yield bond issuances are “144A-for-life,” that is, not subject to registration
rights).
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